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I. INTRODUCTION
Until 1887, almost all reservation lands were held in common for
the benefit of all tribal members. The Dawes Act of 1887 inaugurated
a process of privatizing the reservations by distributing the land to
individual Indians. Between 1887 and the end of allotment in 1934,
118 reservations were allotted., While many parcels were sold,
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* O'Connor Fellow, Arizona State University, Sandra Day O'Connor College of
Law; J.D., Harvard; A.B., Duke. I would like to thank Prof. Gerald Torres for
encouraging this project.
1. AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 95TH CONG., FINAL REPORT 309 (Comm. Print
1977). This number represents more than half of all reservations.
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roughly ten million acres remain in allotted trust status today. 2 For
most Indians, alienation was prohibited, first for twenty-five years
and then indefinitely.
Few Indians made wills (many were not permitted to do so) and
therefore ownership interests descended under state law. In 1984,
three-quarters of allotted land had more than one undivided interest,
i.e. at least two Indians owned the parcel as tenants in common. 3 The
extent of fractionation is rapidly increasing: 350,000 interests in 1984
grew to 1.5 million in 1994.4 By July 2001, the number had increased
to 3.15 million.5 Fractionation is skewed: a majority of the interests
reflects ownership in a minority of the land. Indians own 1.4 million
interests of less than 2% of a parcel, affecting 58,000 tracts. 6 "Eco-
nomically and administratively, allotment is unworkable."7 The ad-
ministrative burden of maintaining over three million records is
significant; the cost was estimated to be at least $17 million per year
in 1999.8 The paperwork required to use allotted lands deters leasing
and other economic uses, depressing returns for individual Indian
owners.
Although the allotment of Indian-owned land is the apotheosis of
fractionation, fractionation undermines land tenure elsewhere. Forty-
one percent of black-owned land in the Southeast United States is
fractionated to some degree. 9 The willingness of courts to partition
land in the Southeast has limited the degree of fractionation (federal
law discourages partition). Partition is frequently combined with sale,
contributing to the loss of black-owned land. Heirship property on the
island of St. Lucia is called "family land" and partition requires con-
sent from all the owners, which encourages fractionation of heirship
2. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CONTEXT AND COMPLEXITY OF THE INDIAN TRUST 2-1 (2001)
[hereinafter CONTEXT].
3. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, 39 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N].
4. Jessica A. Shoemaker, Like Snow in the Springtime: Allotment, Fractionation,
and the Indian Land Tenure Problem, 2003 WIs. L. REV. 729, 747 (2003).
5. Id. (citing BIA Notice to Indian Landowners).
6. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 5.
7. Manuel Lucero, Just Compensation for a Taking-Fractional Interests Escheated
from Tribal Members to the Tribe, Hodel v. Irving, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 287
(1989).
8. Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, S. 1586, Joint Hearings of
the House Resources Comm. and the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th
Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Kevin Gover, Asst. Sec'y
of the Interior for Indian Affairs).
9. Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community through Partition Sales
of Tenancies in Common, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 505, 518 (2001).
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property like in Indian country. Similarly, family land is underutil-
ized because ownership is split between so many individuals.O
While fractionation is a significant problem affecting allotted land,
the burden is very unequal. One-third of all allotted parcels have a
single owner, i.e. no fractionation. Even within fractionated parcels,
the extent of fractionation is skewed. One-quarter of parcels re-
present 81% of interests. Relatively few parcels are extremely frac-
tionated since only 1300 parcels have more than 200 owners. 1 Even
where fractionation is limited, it imposes economic costs. Where frac-
tionation is extreme, the administrative costs sometimes mean that
land remains unused. While fractionation is a significant obstacle to
Indian prosperity, it is not the only impediment to economic develop-
ment. For example, the Presidential Commission on Indian Reserva-
tion Economies identified 2320 individual obstacles in forty major
categories. 12 Among the most frequently cited impediments to eco-
nomic development are the remoteness of most reservations, few re-
sources/poor land, burdensome federal regulations, and tribal politics.
This Article proposes using the corporate form to solve the problem
of fractionation. Part II provides a short summary of allotment and
its effect on Indian land tenure. Part III describes attempts by Con-
gress to reduce fractionation, despite resistance from the courts. Part
IV discusses proposals from the literature on fractionation. Part V de-
scribes the role for tribal land corporations ("TLC") in responding to
fractionation. Part VI analyzes the implications of using eminent do-
main by TLCs. Part VII advances economic arguments in favor of the
TLC. Part VIII concludes.
II. INDIAN LAND AND THE HISTORY OF ALLOTMENT
As early as 1633, non-Indians proposed granting or imposing indi-
vidual ownership of land on Indians.13 Jefferson saw a role for private
property in civilizing and assimilating Indians. 14 Between 1830 and
1880, sixty-seven different tribes were given the opportunity to receive
allotted lands, yet fewer than 5% chose to accept allotment of their
reservations.1 5 In addition, Indians were offered individual land ten-
10. Id. at 522-23.
11. NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING CONSOLIDA-
TION OF FRACTIONAL INTERESTS AS A PART OF THE COBELL SETTLEMENT LEGISLA-
TION 1 (2006) [hereinafter NCAI]. Some estimates run as high as 2000 parcels.
See id. at 5.
12. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 25.
13. JAY KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOST-A CIVILIZATION WON 6, 82 (1937).
14. CHRISTIAN FEEST, DA ROTE AMERIKA: NORDAMERIKAS INDIANER 38-39 (1976).
15. Samuel Taylor, The Origins of the Dawes Act of 1887, at 46 (1927) (unpublished
thesis, Harvard University) (citing statistics presented by Senator Morgan of Ala-
bama, Cong. Record, 46th Cong. 3d Sess. 1060-61). Allotment was part of treaty
negotiations with the Potawatomi, Cherokee, and Chickasaw from 1816 to 1818
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ure off-reservation. In 1875, the Indian Homestead Act offered all the
benefits of the 1862 Act without forfeiting any share of tribal funds.16
Few Indians took advantage of homesteading.17 Although cultural
norms certainly played a role, much of the land set aside as reserva-
tions was inappropriate for small-scale agriculture or ranching.
Ninety percent of the Sioux were reported to oppose allotment because
their land was useless for agriculture and running livestock over a
large range was the only economic use.18 Many Sioux reservations
are concentrated in western South Dakota-a dry region with poor
soils, where even subsistence gardens fail in many years. 19
A. Allotment
The General Allotment Act of 1887, also called the Dawes Act, 20
authorized the President to distribute tribal land held in common to
tribal members individually.2 1 Each tribal member received between
40 and 160 acres (later expanded to 320 acres), depending on age and
sex. (No accommodation was made for future population growth.)
Any land not allotted was declared surplus, removed from trust status
and opened to non-Indian settlement.22 To encourage assimilation,
allotted land was often checkerboarded with surplus land.2 3 Although
tribes ceding surplus land were supposed to benefit from its sale, often
the land was sold on the cheap.2 4 Most surplus land was sold for
and later part of treaties in 1854 with the Oto, Missouri, Omaha, and Shawnee.
Michael L. Lawson, The Fractionated Estate: The Problem of American Indian
Heirship, 21 S.D. HIST. 1, 5 (1991) [heinafter Fractionated Estate]. See MARKKU
HENRIKSSON, THE INDIAN ON CAPITOL HILL: INDIAN LEGISLATION AND THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, 1862-1907, at 177-88 (1988), for a discussion of several pre-
Dawes Act allotments.
16. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 420 (repealed by Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2787). Only citizens could home-
stead under the terms of the 1862 Homestead Act and very few Indians were
citizens before 1924. Indian Citizenship (Snyder) Act, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43
Stat. 233, 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006)).
17. HENRIKSSON, supra note 15, at 135.
18. ANGIE DEBo, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 313 (1970).
19. THOMAS BIOLSI, ORGANIZING THE LAKOTA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
DEAL ON THE PINE RIDGE AND ROSEBUD RESERVATIONS 24 (1992).
20. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (current version
at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)).
21. Although the majority of reservations were allotted with Indian approval, the Act
did not require tribal or individual permission.
22. MARION CLAWSON, UNCLE SAM's ACRES 69 (1970) (arguing that homesteading
privatized enforcement of United States' land claims against the Indian tribes).
23. Providing Indians with non-Indian examples as neighbors was a key benefit.
Senator Henry Teller (of Colorado) argued that blacks had progressed more than
Indians because of more frequent contact with whites. HENRIKSSON, supra note
15, at 170.
24. For strong evidence of below-market sales of surplus land in Gregory County, see
S. Doc. No. 58-158 (1904).
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$1.25 per acre. 25 Even when the federal government paid more, Indi-
ans still received a fraction of the value. In 1901, surplus land on the
Devils Lake Sioux Reservation was ceded to the United States for
$3.32 per acre, but resold for $4.50 per acre. At the time, prairie farm-
land averaged over $7 per acre.2 6 While some of the proceeds were
distributed pro rata among tribal members, some were retained by the
Office of Indian Affairs ("OIA") to offset agency appropriations. 2 7 The
direct administration cost of allotment was $900 million, roughly $10
for each acre transferred to non-Indians. 28
Fearing that non-Indians could quickly come to possess much of
the allotted land,29 the Act prohibited any conveyance for twenty-five
years, including by devise. 30 The trust period was judged sufficient
time for the Indians to "acquire more provident habits... and to learn
how to take care of themselves."31 Under Section 5 of the Act,32 own-
ership of allotment lands descended according to the laws of the state
(or territory) in which reservation was located. Although state and
territorial laws varied in their details, the heirs of intestate estates
were tenants in common of an undivided parcel everywhere reserva-
tions were allotted. 33
Scholars have identified six goals for allotment: weakening the
tribe as a social unit, promoting individual Indian initiative, encour-
aging Indian agriculture, retaining a portion of the reservation as In-
dian land, opening the remainder to non-Indian settlement, and
25. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 8-9.
26. Russel L. Barsh, Indian Resources and the National Economy: Business Cycles
and Policy Cycles, 16 POL'Y STUD. J. 799, 810 (1988).
27. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 8-9. The Office of Indian Affairs was es-
tablished in 1824 as part of the War Department. Secretary of War John C. Cal-
houn had initially called the Office of Indian Affairs the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
but the Bureau consistently worked under the name Office of Indian Affairs until
1947, when it was officially named the Bureau of Indian Affairs. FRANCIS PAUL
PRucHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERI-
CAN INDIANS 1227-28 (1984).
28. In contrast, the cost of purchasing 240 million acres between 1800 and 1840 was
only 7.4¢ per acre. Barsh, supra note 26, at 819.
29. Prior experience with allotment legitimated fears that Indian land would quickly
be lost without restrictions on alienation. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allot-
ment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1559, 1612 (2001).
30. In 1905, the Burke Act authorized the Secretary to issue a fee patent to any "com-
petent" Indian, which removed any restriction on alienation, but also the immu-
nity from state taxation.
31. Carl Schurz, Present Aspects of the Indian Problem (1881), reprinted in AMERI-
CANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN"
1880-1900, at 21 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973).
32. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90 (1887).
33. In Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), the Supreme Court ratified primogeniture




reducing the cost of Indian administration. 3 4 The legislative success
of allotment depended on a coalition of Western agricultural interests
eager for more land and well-meaning Easterners, who thought that
assimilation would civilize Indians and improve their social and eco-
nomic condition. In this view, Indians were held back by both the con-
tinued vitality of tribal social structures and the absence of private
land ownership on reservations.
Both opponents and proponents of allotment believed that Indians
had no private rights in property3 5 and thus Indians had no incentive
to improve the land. The common prohibition on alienation outside
the tribe or group is often characterized as evidence against private
ownership. Yet, most countries do not permit non-citizens to own
land. The United States is the exception rather than the rule.36 Note
that federal law did prohibit the opposite (individuals buying land
from Indians),3 7 but this restriction is not viewed as evidence that
Americans do not recognize private property. Private land tenure
combined with citizenship 3S would encourage assimilation, believed to
be the only route for improving the condition of Indians. Although the
majority of Indians opposed allotment, some Indians were eager for
34. LEONARD A. CARLSON, INDIANS, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAND: THE DAWES ACT AND
THE DECLINE OF INDIAN FARMING 79 (1981). Miner argues that "[ildle land was a
source of frustration to the Gilded Age mentality." H. Craig Miner, The Cherokee
Oil and Gas Co., 1889-1902: Indian Sovereignty and Economic Change, 46 Bus.
HIST. REV. 45, 49 (1972).
35. See Bobroff, supra note 29, for a detailed discussion of both Indian property sys-
tems and non-Indian beliefs about Indian property. See Terry L. Anderson, Con-
servation-Native American Style (Political Economy Research Center, 1996)
[hereinafter Conservation] for a discussion of Indian property systems and envi-
ronmental stewardship. For the argument that Cherokee tribal law provided
more robust protection of individual rights than fee simple, see Stacy L. Leeds,
The Burning of Blackacre: A Step Towards Reclaiming Tribal Property Law, 10
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 493 (2000). Cf Carol M. Rose, Possession as the
Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1985) ("It is doubtful whether the
claims of any nomadic population could ever meet the common law requirements
for establishing property in land [by possession].").
36. In the colonial period, however, many towns restricted the sale or lease of land to
people not already living in that town. Towns in Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and New York could levy large fines for unauthorized sales. John F.
Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARv. L. REV. 1252, 1274 (1996).
37. Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective
on Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 64 (2005) [hereinafter Eminent Domain].
38. The original Dawes Act left the timing of citizenship uncertain. The OIA oper-
ated on the assumption that Indians would receive citizenship upon fee patent-
ing, not upon allotment. In In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905), the Supreme Court
voided the conviction of a Kickapoo allottee for drinking on the grounds that al-
lotment conferred citizenship when the land was allotted. In response, Congress
passed the Burke Act of 1906, restricting citizenship to fee patented Indians.
Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 14.
[Vol. 88:385
TRIBAL LAND CORPORATIONS
individual land tenure. 39 Proponents of allotment relied heavily on
the few Indians who had voiced a desire for private property in land.
Weakening tribal structures was an explicit goal of allotment, in
fact, "this law [was] a mighty pulverizing engine for breaking up the
tribal mass."4 0 Tribalism was identified with a variety of attitudes
and practices considered undesirable. An Indian agent on the Yank-
ton Sioux reservation argued that allotment would curb traditional re-
ligious practices, food sharing, and even "constant visiting."4 1 Senator
Dawes asserted that private property would even encourage Indians
to "keep the peace."42 In addition, private property would encourage
agriculture, investment, and capital accumulation. Without private
property in land, there would be no "selfishness, which is at the bot-
tom of civilization."43 Allotment was an "experiment in social engi-
neering," "hop[ing] to indoctrinate Native Americans to the European
concept of private ownership."4 4
Further impetus for allotment was provided by the OIA as a
bureacracy. Allotment increased funding for the OIA since allotment
itself was time-consuming. After allotment, keeping records, probate,
leasing, sales, fee patenting, etc. all created work for OIA agents. As
fee patenting reduced the acreage under trust, the OIA could see that
continued allotment would reduce the size and budget of the agency.
In the 1920s, the OIA began to devote more energy to manging its
resources; management requires more budget and personnel than
disposal.45
While the end of allotment may have served Indian interests, it
also served OIA interests. Following the passage of the Dawes Act
and the IRA, the OIA budget increased by 20%.46 Interestingly, simi-
39. See LUTHER STANDING BEAR, MY PEOPLE, THE Sioux 287 (1928); THE INDIAN RES-
ERVATION SYSTEM 66-67 (Terry O'Neill ed., 2002). Although Indians generally
acquiesced in allotment, the Yankton Sioux accepted allotment only after an
agent charged with allotting the reservation induced cooperation by calling in
military support. CARLSON, supra note 34, at 41.
40. Merrill E. Gates, Addresses at the Lake Mohonk Conferences (1900), reprinted in
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE IN-
DIAN" 1880-1900 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973), at 339-40, 342.
41. DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 192 (3d ed. 1993).
42. FERGUS BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 118 (1996).
43. PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE
OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN 43 (1886).
44. MICHAEL L. LAWSON, HEIRSHIP: THE INDIAN AMOEBA 1 (1982) [hereinafter HEIR-
SHIP] (incorporated as part of S. 2480-S. 2663: Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong, 76-104 (1984)).
45. See Fred S. McChesney, Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands,
Ethnic Externalities, and Bureacratic Budgets, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 322-27
(1990).
46. While the OIA budget continued to increase between 1887 and 1934, appropria-
tions increased at a diminishing rate, reflecting the shrinking responsibilities of
the OIA. Id. at 329.
2009]
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lar results were found for the opening of the public domain, a simu-
lateanous process with allotment. Before 1920, bureaucrats found
that land sales increased their budgets and staffing. After 1920,
"management of land [became] a source of greater appropriations than
disposal."47 Perhaps not coincidentally, lands sales came to a close in
1934 with the Taylor Grazing Act.48
Congress voted in 1891 to authorize limited leasing4 9 of allotted
lands by non-Indians, and then in 1910 to permit widespread leas-
ing.50 Leasing was further liberalized in 1921.51 Combined with re-
straints on alienation, the ability to lease made it easier for Indians to
transfer land to non-Indians, harder to transfer land to other Indians,
and nearly impossible to reshuffle Indian land holdings to increase
efficiency. 52 Indian agencies controlled every aspect of leasing and its
proceeds and often strongly discouraged the practice, since it con-
flicted with the goals of allotment.5 3 And yet, when Indian ranching
proved successful, the OIA encouraged Indians to sell their herds and
lease the land to non-Indians.54
OIA control of lease proceeds was near absolute. The proceeds of
leasing were deposited in Individual Indian Money ("IIM") accounts,
but withdrawing any money required a purchase order. The OIA had
nearly unlimited authority to approve or reject purchase orders, giv-
ing the OIA veto power over the purchase of clothing, seed, supplies,
and even baby clothes.5 5 Yet the practice of leasing at the expense of
Indian farming or ranching increased sharply through the period of
allotment. The small size of parcels combined with capital shortages
47. Gary D. Libecap, Bureaucratic Opposition to the Assignment of Property Rights:
Overgrazing on the Western Range, 41 J. ECON. HIST. 151, 157 (1981).
48. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (2006).
49. Act of February 28, 1891, ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 794, 795 (authorizing leasing for
the infirm) (repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-462, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1991, 2007). In addition, the amend-
ments authorized allotments of eighty acres to each adult, thus protecting di-
vorced wives. CARLSON, supra note 34, at 12. If the reservation was insufficient
to allow each Indian eighty acres, then the parcels would be reduced, but the
ratio maintained. HENRIKSSON, supra note 15, at 173.
50. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 4, 36 Stat. 855, 856-57 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 403 (2006)) (authorizing leasing for up to 5 years). Informal leasing had devel-
oped and formal permission would consolidate OIA control over leasing. Roy W.
MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY ON TRIAL
196 (1993).
51. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 11.
52. CARLSON, supra note 34, at 90.
53. MEYER, supra note 50, at 196.
54. JANET McDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-1934, at
38 (1991).
55. BioLSi, supra note 19, at 16-17.
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meant that many Indians could receive more by leasing the land than
by working it themselves. 56
In addition, allotted land was converted to fee in certain cases,
leading to non-Indian settlement within reservations.S7 Congress au-
thorized sale-upon request of a single competent heir-with the pro-
ceeds divided between heirs in 1902.58 Only 20% of fee-patented lands
remain in Indian ownership, shrinking the Indian land base by
roughly twenty-three million acres. 59 On most reservations, Indians
lost more than three-quarters of all their fee-patented land by 1934.60
As lands were leased, the OIA often encouraged allottees to apply for
fee patenting and sell their land.6 1 Fee-patented land sold to non-In-
dians and surplus land reduces tribal sovereignty and introduces ju-
risdictional complexity. 6 2 Jurisdictional complexity deters economic
use because of the risk of double or triple taxation, zoning uncertainty,
and increased transaction costs such as complicated title searches.
B. The Effects of Allotment
Allotment did not provide Indians with individual economic oppor-
tunity. Where on-reservation agriculture had been viable, allotment
disrupted production; Indians were more successful as farmers before
allotment than afterwards. 6 3 Not surprisingly, agriculture was
strongest among tribes with agricultural traditions. Erroneously, the
Pueblos of the Southwestern United States and the Five Civilized
Tribes64 have been identified as the only successful farmers west of
56. The unpredictable climate of the high plains made small-scale ranching particu-
larly difficult. MEYER, supra note 50, at 196.
57. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 29.
58. Roughly 3.7 million acres were lost through supervised sales. In 1913, there was
a backlog of 40,000 requests, affecting $60 million worth of land. Fractionated
Estate, supra note 15, at 13-14. The pace of fee patenting reflected the demand
for land, which fluctuated with crop and livestock prices. CARLSON, supra note
34, at 51.
59. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 4; Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 15.
60. McDONNELL, supra note 54, at 106-07, 112-13.
61. Id. at 55. For example, the Rosebud BIA encouraged the sale of well-watered
land that produced high lease income in order to consolidate Indian ownership in
drier land, ostensibly to permit more Indians to ranch. Carl K. Eicher, Con-
straints on Economic Progress on the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation 222-23
(Dec., 1960) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University) (on file with
Harvard University Archives).
62. The Court has decided a string of Indian Country diminishment cases. See South
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399
(1994); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima, 492 U.S. 408,
409-13 (1989); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1984); Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
63. CARLSON, supra note 34.
64. The Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek (Muskogee), Choctaw, and Seminole were
termed the Five Civilized Tribes because many in those tribes had adopted Euro-
2009] 393
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the Mississippi. However, the Santee Sioux, Yankton Sioux, and the
Coeur d'Alene adopted individual plot agriculture before allotment.
Indian farming before allotment was growing quickly, albeit from a
very small base on many reservations. 65
Carlson argues that allotment itself increased leasing to non-Indi-
ans, decreased capital accumulation, and reduced the rate at which
Indians learned to farm. Before allotment, individual Indians could
not transfer land to non-Indians. Undercapitalization depressed re-
turns, but Indians had no alternative to farming. After allotment,
farming declined on many reservations, including the Santee, Sis-
seton, and Coeur d'Alene. 66 By 1900, Sisseton-Wahpeton tribal mem-
bers cultivated 52% less acreage than before allotment in 1887. From
4000 acres in 1900, cultivation shrank further to 3100 acres in 1927.67
Irrigated farming by Indians was particularly unsuccessful, largely
because irrigated farming was capital-intensive and Indians had lim-
ited access to capital. 68 In 1937, 68% of irrigated land was leased to
non-Indians.69
Allotment also disrupted Indian ranching, largely because allot-
ments were much smaller than the size of an efficient ranch. In con-
trast to the expectations of many non-Indians about allotment, Indian
fears were prescient: allotment ultimately permitted "white settlers
... [to] monopolize the grazing."70 Stocking densities common near
the Rosebud Reservation in the 1930s indicate that an allottee could
run seven or eight cattle on a single 160-acre parcel, much too small a
herd to compete with non-Indian ranchers. Even the poorest off-reser-
vation ranches ran fifty or more cattle on at least 1000 acres. 71 In
addition, checkerboarding further discouraged productive use of the
land since each family's parcels were not contiguous.72
When allotment came to a close, non-Indians leased a total of 13.9
million acres of Indian land.73 Almost all of the Pine Ridge reserva-
tion was leased to non-Indian ranchers in 1918.7 4 In 1935, non-Indi-
pean agriculture, including slavery, while still living in the Southeastern United
States. In the 1830s, the Five Civilized Tribes were removed to Oklahoma, then
called Indian Territory.
65. CARLSON, supra note 34, at 86-87, 118, 120-21, 126-29.
66. Id. at 137-38.
67. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 7.
68. CARLSON, supra note 34, at 140-41.
69. Barsh, supra note 26, at 821.
70. 1898 ANN. REP. OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 276.
71. Richmond L. Clow, The Rosebud Tribe and the Creation of TLE, 1943-1955: A
Case of Tribal Heirship Land Management, in TRUSTEESHIP IN CHANGE: TOWARD
TRIBAL AUTONOMY IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 146 (Richmond L. Clow & Imre
Sutton eds., 2001).
72. BIoLSI, supra note 19, at 13.
73. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 11.
74. BIOLSI, supra note 19, at 30.
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ans farmed over one million acres on Pine Ridge, while Indians
cultivated only 12,109 acres. Although the disparity was not as great
on the Rosebud reservations, non-Indians still farmed or ranched over
four times as much land as tribal members. 75 In the 1930s, a depart-
mental report characterized Indians as a "race of petty landlords" de-
pending on unearned, but limited, income. 76 Over half of the
Sisseton-Wahpeton lived entirely on lease income in 1900,77 and leas-
ing was the single largest source of income on the Pine Ridge Reserva-
tion in 1921.78
Eventually, the OIA did attempt to improve the returns on leasing.
Before 1930, non-Indians could lease individual parcels of allotted
land. Ranchers could opt to lease only those parcels with water, even
though free-roaming cattle would certainly graze on adjacent parcels.
Instead of leasing adjacent pastureland, the rancher would pay only a
small trespass fee when his cattle were discovered. In the 1930s, the
OIA shifted to unit leasing: trust land (whether tribal or allotted) was
divided so that each unit had water, pasture, and shelter. Ranchers
would bid for permits that specified the number of animals. The OIA
hoped to reduce overgrazing while maximizing the return of all own-
ers of a unit. In addition, Indian ranchers with small herds were
given preference and paid less in grazing fees, although larger Indian
ranchers faced competitive bidding.79
While allotment failed to provide Indians with economic opportu-
nity, one of its other goals was achieved. In 1887, Indians owned 138
million acres,8 0 but retained only fifty-two million acres by 1934 when
further allotment came to an end.8 1 For example, only 12% of the
1887 area of the Lake Traverse (Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux) Reserva-
tion remains in trust status today.8 2 Allotment began where the agri-
cultural values were highest: in areas with more rain, proximity to
non-Indian settlement, and more land appropriate for commercial
farming.8 3 To accommodate non-Indian buyers of surplus land, the
75. Id. at 116.
76. NATURAL RESOURCES BOARD, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN LAND TENURE, Eco-
NOMIC STATUS, AND POPULATION TRENDS, PART X OF THE REPORT ON LAND PLAN-
NING 2, 7 (1935).
77. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 7.
78. BIOLSI, supra note 19, at 13.
79. Id. at 117-118; MEYER, supra note 50, at 196.
80. OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN LAND TENURE, Eco-
NOMIC STATUS AND POPULATION TRENDS 6 (1935).
81. The Indian land base before allotment was roughly equal to the area of
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska, while the land base in 1934 was roughly equal
to Kansas. Since 1934, lands held in trust have increased by eight million acres.
Mitchell, supra note 9, at 576.
82. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 6.
83. In fact, these factors explain two-thirds of the variation in the timing of allot-
ment. In addition, the rank order of allotment was significantly correlated with
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best agricultural land and timber were not allotted to Indians.8 4 The
Commissioner of Indian Affairs described the land set aside for the
Sioux as "largely unfitted" for agriculture.8 5
Allotment, leasing, and fee patenting were largely driven by non-
Indian demand for land.8 6 Additional demand by non-Indians for al-
lotted land led to Congressional action in 1902 to authorize heirs to
sell land and then in 1906 to permit original allottees to sell-both
sales subject to Secretarial approval.8 7 The leased acreage increased
from eight to eighteen million between 1910 and 1918. At the peak of
wartime demand for additional land, the OIA adopted a policy of re-
moving restrictions on alienation, even in the face of Indian opposi-
tion. When agricultural prices collapsed in peacetime, the OIA
abandoned "forced fee" patenting in 1921.88 Tribes with an ability to
resist pressure for allotment have better maintained a tribal land
base-which may provide greater income and security today.8 9
The effects of allotment were not limited to the loss of a tribal land
base. Productive use of allotment lands was seriously disrupted by
Section 5 of the Dawes Act, which governed inheritance of allotted
lands. The common law favors partition or sale when multiple parties
inherit interests in the same parcel intestate. Neither was consistent
with the goals of allotment, so heirs received undivided interests.90
By 1892, Indian agents noticed that the effects of descent governed by
state law were undermining the ability of Indians to benefit from al-
lotment. The agent at the Puyallup reservation (near Tacoma, Wash-
ington) reported that:
upon the death of the original grantees the right to the land gets so divided
and subdivided that no one has sufficient preponderance of property in the
land to make it to his interest to improve it. After a few subsequent deaths of
the heirs the title becomes so interminably mixed that it is next to impossible
to clear it up. Not being alienable there can nothing be done.9 1
four measures of the attractiveness of land in the state. CAaLSON, supra note 34,
at 43-51, 57-75, 166-67.
84. KLAUS FRANTz, INDIAN RESERVATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: TERRITORY, SOVER-
EIGNTY AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE 26 (1999); Carl G. Hakansson, Allotment at
Pine Ridge Reservation: Its Consequences and Alternative Remedies, 73 N.D. L.
REV. 231, 236 (1997).
85. L. W. COLBY, THE SIOUX INDIAN WAR OF 1890-291, in Transactions and Reports of
the Nebraska State Historical Society 174 (1892) (citing Letter from Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, to Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 26, 1890)).
86. Barsh, supra note 26, at 799-801, 810.
87. HEIRSHIP, supra note 34, at 4.
88. Barsh, supra note 26, at 810-12.
89. The Menominee of Wisconsin successfully resisted allotment and today the vol-
ume of sawtimber is greater than when the reservation was created, despite in-
tensive management. PAULA ROGERS HUFF & MARSHALL PECORE, INSTITUTE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, CASE STUDY: MENOMINEE TRIBAL ENTERPRISES (1995).
90. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 7.
91. [1892] 2 ANN. REP. OF THE SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR 193.
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Testamentary disposition was first permitted in 1910, subject to ap-
proval by the Secretary of the Interior. 92 Even today, wills disposing
of trust property require Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") approval.
While some BIA offices approve wills posthumously, other offices in-
validate wills lacking formal approval during life. The BIA also has
latitude to disapprove wills, particularly those disinheriting a spouse
or children.9 3
As early as 1928, the federal government recognized the increasing
problem of fractionation. 94 Congress ended further allotment in 1934
with the Indian Reorganization Act, but did nothing to reverse (or pre-
vent further) fractionation in lands already allotted.95 The OIA began
exploring strategies to reverse fractionation as early as 1938.96 By
the 1930s, the OIA estimated that the administrative cost of leasing
was greater than the revenue generated.9 7
The burden of fractionation is not merely administrative. Small
parcel size (without the ability to combine parcels in a free market)
distorted economic choices facing Indian ranchers. On the Santee
Sioux reservation, wheat displaced cattle production even though
"[t]he land was better suited to the range cattle industry, but allot-
ment in severalty had so broken up the Indians' holdings that cattle
could not be run over large expanses of territory."98 Intensive wheat
cultivation led to crop failures and soil exhaustion. 99 In 1935, 25,000
acres on the Lake Traverse Reservation lay unused because of trans-
action costs caused by fractionation.10 0
In 1959, the GAO reported to Congress that fractionation in-
creased the BIA cost of management by $1 million. In response, the
House requested more information about fractionation and the Indian
Heirship Land Survey was completed in 1961, finding that fractiona-
tion increased federal costs while decreasing heir income. Half of af-
fected land was being used by non-Indians, while 3% was not used at
92. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 2, 36 Stat. 855, 856 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 373 (2006)).
93. Antonina Vaznelis, Probating Indian Wills: Conqueror's Court versus Decedent
Intent, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 287, 293-94, 297 (1982).
94. LEwis MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 40-41 (1928) (for the
Institute for Government Research).
95. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-479 (2006)). Allotments continue to descend and devise according to state
law; in addition, a provision for automatic reversion to tribal corporations was
removed. See BioLsi, supra note 19, at 76.
96. See WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN, JR., RESUME OF PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE ON INDIAN
ALLOTTED AND HEIRSHIP-LAND PROBLEM (Aug. 14-17, 1938) (available from the
National Indian Law Library).
97. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 11.
98. MEYER, supra note 50, at 191.
99. Id. at 183.
100. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 8.
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all.lOl A majority of heirs did not live on the reservation,10 2 and only
one-third lived on trust land. Only one-fifth of heirs farmed or
ranched their own land. The average heir had between three and four
interests, generating between $50 and $100 in annual income.103 By
1960, there were three million acres of allotted lands that had at least
six owners per parcel. In roughly half of the allotted trust lands, own-
ership was split between at least two owners. 10 4 In a study of twelve
of the eighteen reservations affected by allotment, the GAO found that
20% of parcels had at least one owner with less than a 2% interest.
Interests of 2% or less constitute two-thirds of the interests recorded
and increased from 305,000 to 620,000 between 1984 and 1992.105
Pine Ridge was allotted relatively late, yet the average parcel had
thirteen owners by 1992.106 In 1987, the average parcel on the Lake
Traverse ReservationO 7 was only forty acres, but had 196 owners.
The average owner had undivided interests in fourteen different par-
cels.1OS Parcel 1305 is rather famous with 439 owners sharing 40
acres by 1982. The largest owner receives $82.85 annually, and two-
thirds receive less than $1 per year. Half of those receive less than
five cents annually, while the smallest interest receives one cent every
177 years.l 0 9 If partitioned, the smallest heir would receive thirteen
square inches. The BIA spends $17,560 annually administering this
parcel alone. 110 Reservation-wide, the BIA estimated that it spends
$50 per heir to process a lease.11 In fact, the BIA spends 50% to 75%
of its realty budget on administering allotted trust lands.112
101. Today, 21% of trust land is unused. It is unclear, however, how much can be
attributed to fractionation since there is no economic use for some land. CON-
TEXT, supra note 2, at 2-1.
102. Further complicating the picture, a majority of heirs had interests on more than
one reservation.
103. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 25.
104. House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Indian Heirship Land Study,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1961).
105. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO/RCED-92-96BR, PROFILE OF LAND OwN-
ERSHIP AT 12 RESERVATIONS 1-2, 23 (1992) (Briefing Rep. to the Chairman, Select
Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs).
106. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 753.
107. The Lake Traverse Reservation was the first to be allotted. One-third of the res-
ervation was allotted to individual Indians, while the remaining two-thirds were
sold for $2.50 per acre to non-Indian settlers. See HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at
5-6.
108. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712 (1987).
109. Since the BIA will not issue a check for less than $5, it will take 88,652 years
before this heir will receive payment.
110. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 10-11.
111. S. 2480-S. 2663: Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 98th Cong, 55, 61 (1984) (statement of Bertram E. Hirsch, Gen. Counsel,
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe).
112. Joint Hearings, supra note 8; NCAI, supra note 11, at 1.
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In 2002, the BIA managed fifty-six million acres of trust land. Ten
million acres belonged to individual Indians and the BIA managed
100,000 leases. Leasing (and sales) of individual land generated $300
million.113 In 2002, nearly half of IIM accounts for income-generating
allotted lands held less than $15 and 18,605 had a balance of less than
$1. In addition, there were 62,000 accounts where the owner's where-
abouts were unknown.114 Mismanagement by the BIA of IIM ac-
counts is the subject of the long-running Cobell litigation.
Management of allotted trust land remains a "bureaucratic nightmare
without parallel."115
III. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
Since 1983, Congress has sought to reduce fractionation by alter-
ing the laws governing inheritance of allotted land. The Supreme
Court curtailed the first two attempts. As noted before, the number of
undivided interests has expanded from roughly 300,000 to more than
three million since 1983.116
A. Indian Land Consolidation Act
In 1983, Congress passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act
("ILCA") to reduce the fractionation of allotted lands.117 The BIA had
long argued for replacing state inheritance law with primogeniture,
combined with some form of escheat.11s As originally enacted, Section
207 of the ILCA provided that undivided interests consisting of less
than 2% of the total acreage and producing less than $100 in income
in the preceding year would escheat to the tribe without
compensation.119
113. CONTEXT, supra note 2, at 2-1.
114. OFFICE OF HISTORICAL TRUST ACCOUNTING, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE HISTORICAL ACCOUNTING OF INDIVIDUAL INDIAN MONEY AC-
COUNTS 13 (2002). The Office of the Special Trustee estimates there were 68,000
unclaimed IIM accounts in 2004. NCAI, supra note 11, at 4.
115. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 1.
116. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 747.
117. In contrast, Norway attempted to reduce fractionation through a specialized
court. Enclosure combined with subdivision created excessive fragmentation of
agricultural and pastoral land. In 1821, Norway created a Land Consolidation
Service as an ongoing process to adjust to changing land use. See Mitchell, supra
note 9, at 563-64, 573-74.
118. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 17-18.
119. "No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a
tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent
[sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe if such interest repre-
sents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its
owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat." Indian
Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-459, § 207, 96 Stat 2515, 2519
(current version at 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a) (2006)).
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In response to escheat under Section 207, members of the Oglala
Sioux tribe sued, asserting a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Jus-
tice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Hodel v. Irving, which
held that Section 207 was unconstitutional. The Court did not over-
turn Jefferson v. Fink,120 which recognizes that Congress has broad
authority to regulate the devise and descent of Indian trust lands.
Nor did it rely on the long series of cases recognizing that the govern-
ment has ample latitude in regulated property, 12 1 even when the own-
ers are adversely affected. In addition, the Court conceded that "the
whole benefit gained [from Section 207] is greater than the sum of the
burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more productive than
fractionated lands."122 The overlap between tribal membership and
ownership of escheatable interests was not perfect, but the Court rec-
ognized something akin to the "average reciprocity of advantage" de-
veloped in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.123 The Court still found
Section 207 unconstitutional, however, on the grounds that abolishing
devise and descent for affected Indians was an uncompensated
taking.124
Escheat upon death has been described as economically-attrac-
tive.12 5 While reducing fractionation should increase the economic re-
turns from allotted land, probate is an inefficient mechanism.
Increasing consolidation to the point of economic viability12 6 through
probate would take decades. Additionally, each interest in probate
must be calculated, verified, and recorded. If Congress has deter-
120. 247 U.S. 288 (1918).
121. The definition of property is circular because property is an interest that a court
will recognize and protect. See Kathleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Prop-
erty Norms and the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 614(2000). Since the definition of property is unmoored from logic, the Court has
considerable latitude to pick and choose which interests it will protect and which
it will not.
122. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
123. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
124. Cf Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) ("Nothing in the Federal
Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish
the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.").
125. Guzman, supra note 121, at 640. Guzman argues that escheat provisions would
create "economic harm" because owners might spend more than the value of the
parcel to avoid escheat and maintain the parcel in family ownership. Id. at
654-55. If the value of the parcel is less than the transactional costs of convey-
ance, then recognizing and protecting the interest is in itself economically harm-
ful. Interests worth less than the cost of conveyance should not be recognized as
property interests.
126. Generally, undivided interests less than 10% or 20% have no market value. See
Widdoss Report 2 (Letter from John Widdoss and Jerry Hulm, May 5, 2006). In
contrast, Guzman asserts that the "transfer value.., tracked the economic value
of the interest itself." Guzman, supra note 121, at 632. No citation or source is
given so it is difficult to evaluate this surprising claim.
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mined that interests smaller than 2% are too small to be worth pro-
tecting, immediate escheat would be many times more efficient.
B. Amendments to the ILCA
Before Irving was decided, Congress amended Section 207 in three
important ways. First, the requirement that interests liable to es-
cheat produce less than $100 in the previous year was changed to in-
terests "incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years
[following the] decedent's death."12 7 Failing to earn $100 in any of the
five years preceding the decedent's death created a rebuttable pre-
sumption of future poverty.128 Second, interests that would otherwise
escheat to the tribe could be devised to any other owner of the par-
cel.129 Last, tribes were permitted to adopt codes regulating the de-
scent or devise of fractionated lands, subject to Secretarial
approval.130
Members of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck Res-
ervation sued over fractionated interests in the Fort Peck, Standing
Rock, and Devils Lake Sioux reservations. Relying heavily on Irving,
the Court found in Babbitt v. Youpee131 that the amendments to Sec-
tion 207 did not cure its unconstitutionality. These decisions have
been described as "inconsistent analysis,"132 "strain [ed],"133 "strange
and [defiant],"134 and "particularly pernicious. " 1 35 Note the absurdity
in permitting the federal government to restrict alienation severely
during life, but not after death. The irony is especially rich where the
inter vivos restrictions have destroyed most of the value for many
heirs and the escheat provision would create value (perhaps even for
heirs with interests in several parcels).
127. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a) (1996).
128. Even a rebuttable presumption may not adequately protect owners of parcels
with intermittent income potential. While ranching, agriculture and some min-
ing produce annual lease income, forestry does not. See Guzman, supra note 121,
at 633-34 n.151. Perhaps the appraised value would be a better measure than
income.
129. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(b).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(c).
131. 519 U.S. 234 (1997). But cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (finding no
taking despite a complete ban on alienation of personal property).
132. John Leavitt, Hodel v. Irving: The Supreme Court's Emerging Takings Analysis-
A Question of How Many Pumpkin Seeds per Acre 18 ENVTL. L. 597, 624 (1988).
133. Douglas Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1664 (1988).
134. Ronald Chester, Essay: Is the Right to Devise Property Constitutionally Protected?
The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 1195, 1197-1198 (1995).
135. LAWRENCE WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 11 (1997).
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In 2000, Congress amended the ILCA again.136 Again, tribes were
authorized to adopt probate codes governing the descent and devise of
trust and allotted lands, subject to Secretarial approval.13 7 Where
tribes had not done so, descent and distribution were governed by uni-
form federal rules. (In contrast, the Dawes Act applied the inheri-
tance law of the state or territory in which the reservation was
located.) To preserve the trust status of allotted lands, non-Indian
heirs may only receive a life interest. The remainder interest de-
scends to first- and second-degree Indian heirs. If no Indian heirs ex-
ist, another owner of an undivided interest may purchase the
remainder. If no offer is forthcoming, the remainder interests pass to
the tribe.
In addition, the law creates a presumption that interests devised to
more than one person are joint tenancies with a right of survivorship.
Absent a will,138 interests of less than 5% descend with a right of sur-
vivorship, leaving the entire interest to one person. Interests greater
than 5%, however, descend as tenancies in common. Although the
stated policy of the Act is to reduce fractionation,139 this provision will
encourage fractionation until every interest is less than 5%. This pro-
vision does nothing to reduce fractionation, except by happenstance.
In addition, conveyance of fractionated interests is liberalized by this
amendment, but the procedure is still burdensome.140
C. Federal Purchase of Fractionated Interests
In 1994 as part of a revision of ILCA, the BIA proposed buying
heavily fractionated interests and transferring the interests to the rel-
evant tribe. However, the federal government would retain the lease
income until the purchase price was paid.141 The main beneficiary of
this proposal is the BIA since it saves significant amounts of money
currently spent on recordkeeping. Yet, the BIA would divert income
until the purchase price is paid, essentially double-dipping. The fed-
eral government should not insist on double compensation for amelio-
rating a problem of its own creation. Yet, this proposal was
incorporated in the 2000 amendments of the ILCA.142 A three-year
pilot program was established with three tribes in Wisconsin and
136. Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114
Stat. 1991 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
137. Id. at § 103(3) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2205 (2006)).
138. The majority of Indians die intestate, although those with greater assets are
more likely to prepare a will. CONTEXT, supra note 2, at 2-10.
139. Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 § 102 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 2201, Historical and Statutory Notes, Declaration of Policy (2006)).
140. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 770-71.
141. Hakansson, supra note 84, at 254-55.
142. Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 § 103(6) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2212 (2006)).
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36,000 interests were acquired.14 3 The BIA estimates that this pilot
program will eventually save the federal government $2.5 million in
administration.144 The program was expanded and had spent $97
million on land consolidation before 2006. Interests in 243,000 parcels
were acquired, preventing the creation of roughly 600,000 new inter-
ests. Unfortunately, the number of interests is increasing so rapidly
that it would cost $135 million each year just to maintain the current
level of fractionation. With funding from Congress, there is the poten-
tial to expand this program. Seventy percent of heirs contacted by the
test program volunteered to sell their interests, indicating that frac-
tionation could be significantly reduced through voluntary
purchase.145
Since the 1930s, the BIA has spent more money administering al-
lotted lands than those lands have generated in income.14 6 No private
party would continue to use a resource where the costs were greater
than the benefit received. Federal resources are limited and allotment
administration makes America poorer; those resources could have
been used to build roads, clinics, etc. (Alternately, the federal govern-
ment could reduce taxes.) As detrimental as most BIA mismanage-
ment is, the effects are mostly distributional: losses to Indians are
gains to non-Indians. Stealing from Indians is wrong, but the wrong
is more egregious when the theft does not benefit anyone. Rather
than continue to waste limited federal resources, the BIA should
purchase all interests worth less than the cost of administration. 147
For example, "famous" Parcel 1305 is appraised at $8000,148 which
is only slightly more than half the annual cost of administering the
parcel. Clearly, the BIA should purchase Parcel 1305 from the 439
heirs. The BIA could even pay twice the appraised value of Parcel
1305 and still break even within the first year. 14 9 Since one of the
goals of reversing fractionation is the expansion of the tribal land
base, the BIA should donate the parcel to the Sisseton-Wahpeton
tribe. Even though the BIA donates the parcel to the tribe, the BIA
(and hence the taxpayer) still comes out ahead in the first year.
143. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 769.
144. Indian Land Plan Could Save Millions, OK DAILY, Nov. 5, 1999, at 4.
145. NCAI, supra note 11, at 3.
146. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 11.
147. OIA staff in South Dakota proposed this in 1941. See Clow, supra note 71, at
149-50.
148. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 10. The appraised value is close to the estimated
value using the annual income of $1080 and the 1982 OMB discounting rate. The
present value of an asset producing a perpetual income stream is PV = C/i. See
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEcUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCU-
LAR No. 1-94, GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT RATES FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL PROGRAMS app. C (1992) (Table of Past Years Discount Rates).
149. Using the same methodology as note 150, the net present value to the BIA of
saving $17,560 in annual administrative costs is at least $135,000.
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Unfortunately, Congress has not authorized the BIA to acquire
heavily fractionated parcels more generally, even where acquisition
would be cost-effective in the short-term (even within the year in the
case of parcels like Parcel 1305). Unilateral action by the executive
branch has been viewed with suspicion, but Congress and the courts
should not attempt to prevent the BIA from purchasing parcels where
purchase improves the returns for Indian heirs and saves the tax-
payer money.
The pilot program suggests that a majority of owners will volunta-
rily sell their land to the BIA. However unpopular, forced purchase is
justified where the costs of administration are greater than the reve-
nue generated. Critics will argue that forced purchase of interests
amounts to a second appropriation, stealing Indian land all over
again. While emotionally resonant, the argument is largely specious.
BIA management combined with the trivial value of many interests
has already severed whatever connections heirs might have to a tangi-
ble piece of land.1 50 Shoemaker asserts that Indians have already suf-
fered a "constructive dispossession" since the "factual reality" of
allotment is such that Indians retain "few, if any, of the beneficial as-
pects of property."15 1
Of course, there are many parcels where the administrative costs
are less than lease income. The problem of fractionation will not be
solved merely by eliminating the most heavily fractionated parcels.
D. American Indian Probate Reform Act
In 2004, the American Indian Probate Reform Act ("AIPRA")
changed some of the rules governing intestate succession, but main-
tained the distinctions between Indian 15 2 and non-Indian heirs and
interests smaller and larger than 5%. Testamentary disposition is
limited to lineal descendents, other co-owners of the same parcel, the
tribe, or any other Indian. Alternately, the testator may devise to in-
eligible heirs a life interest or convert the interest to fee.153
Without a valid will, trust property descends to lineal descendents
and then to parents or siblings. Recipients must be Indians, lineal
descendents within two generations of an Indian, or co-owners of the
same parcel. If there are no eligible heirs, and no other co-owners
buys the interest, the interest escheats to the tribe.154 Surviving
spouses only inherit in the absence of other heirs, otherwise receiving
150. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 751. Cf Guzman, supra note 123, at 633 (comparing
land to a Van Gogh painting), 635 ("spiritual connection to the land").
151. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 730 & n.5.
152. Note the definition of "Indian" is broadened. See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006).
153. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(b) (2006).
154. Note that AIPRA studiously avoided using this term. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(a)(2)(B)(v) (2006). Guzman asserts that it is consistent with Irving and
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one-third of any money in an IIM account and a life estate in the trust
property. 155 In contrast to the amendments enacted in 2000, small
fractional interests do not descend to all the heirs as tenants in com-
mon, but instead to a single (oldest) heir.156
Although the goal is to facilitate estate planning by owners of frac-
tionated interests, even the BIA acknowledges that these probate
rules are "complex." 15 7 The BIA encourages Indians to write wills,158
yet it no longer provides assistance in drafting and storing wills.159
The BIA retains the power to disapprove wills for defects in formality
or even the content of a will. Although AIPRA continues to authorize
tribes to establish probate codes, only two tribes have done so and re-
ceived Secretarial approval.160
Perhaps it is too soon to judge AIPRA; but because the changes to
inheritance laws are hardly radical it appears that fractionation will
decline only slowly. No "changes in the laws of inheritance, no matter
how far-reaching, would consolidate the number of interests in any
reasonable period of time."161 The problems of fractionation have in-
creased since 1887, but proposals to eliminate the problem should aim
to do so in less than 122 years. Since AIPRA does nothing to consoli-
date interests larger than 5%, fractionation will not disappear even by
2131. If"[s]omeone once said that for every person attacking the roots
of evil there will be at least a hundred who are only attacking its
leaves,"162 then perhaps AIPRA is merely topiary.
IV. PROPOSALS FROM THE LITERATURE
ON FRACTIONATION
The literature on fractionation includes several good proposals to
limit or reverse fractionation, but these proposals share a certain mod-
esty. Modesty should not be taken as a virtue in this context since the
degree of fractionation has increased sharply in recent years. Since
1984, three million undivided interests have been created, a ten-fold
Youpee to make the tribe the sole heir, so long as testamentary freedom is main-
tained. See Guzman, supra note 121, at 622.
155. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a)(2)(A) (2006).
156. Primogeniture as an inheritance rule for Indian property is not entirely novel.
See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
157. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS & OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL TRUSTEE FOR AMERICAN IN-
DIANS, UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICAN INDIAN PROBATE REFORM ACT OF 2004.
158. Id.
159. David Melmer, Congress and Tribes at Odds over Trust and Land, INDIAN COUN-
TRY TODAY, Mar. 1, 2006.
160. The Lummi Nation (of Washington) and the Oglala Sioux.
161. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 566.
162. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Rolling Up Our Sleeves on Indian Trust Reform, IN-
DIAN COUNTRY TODAY, July 3, 2002, at A5.
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increase from the total number of interests that existed in 1984.163
Taking the various proposals together, it is possible to achieve real
progress. The proposals fall into three categories: changing default
rules, reducing the cost of land acquisition, and encouraging private
consolidation.
Several commentators have suggested changing the default rules
to discourage fractionation. Although Mitchell does argue that default
rules like intestacy should be reformed, his main argument is that the
default rules governing co-ownership should be written to model those
governing a limited liability corporation. Mitchell's core interest is the
loss of black-owned farmland, where the problem of fractionation is
less acute. Where the number of owners is smaller and the prospects
for cooperative use better, Mitchell's proposal is more appropriate. i 6 4
Shoemaker proposes eliminating intestacy as a default and replacing
it with a "more flexible, case-by-case . . . equitable distribution."16 5
Among a variety of proposed guidelines for these ad-hoc distributions,
Shoemaker encourages distributing interests in their entirety. Since
most Indians with at least one undivided interest have interests in
several different parcels, it may be possible to freeze fractionation
without depriving any heir of a more-or-less even share of the estate.
Like Mitchell and Leeds, Shoemaker proposes favoring local heirs.
If the shares in consideration are large enough to permit some possi-
ble use, there is some justification for favoring on-reservation heirs
over more (geographically) distant heirs. If the interests are too small
to permit use, then the rationale for favoritism is much weaker. 16 6
Unfortunately, Shoemaker concedes a central role for the BIA with
tribes restricted to recommending a particular distribution.167 The
BIA has shown itself unable to protect Indian interests. As much as
the BIA may assert that it would like to reduce or eliminate fractiona-
tion, the administrative nightmare is a gravy train for the BIA. With-
out fractionation, the workload of the BIA would shrink significantly,
meaning decreased funding and almost certain job losses.
Leeds argues that tribes should acquire future interests.1 68 Alter-
nately, she proposes that tribes acquire a joint tenancy with a right of
163. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 747.
164. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 567-72.
165. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 782-83.
166. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 565.
167. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 786.
168. In her own words, her proposal "borders on predatory lending" since she proposes
that tribes acquire these interests in exchange for small payments to settle con-
sumer debt. Stacy L. Leeds, Borrowing from Blackacre: Expand Tribal Land Ba-




survivorship. 169 Both alternatives reduce the cost of land consolida-
tion, but many tribes do not have the resources to acquire even future
or joint interests.
An alternative to increased tribal control over fractionated lands
would be improved control by individual Indians. For some Indians,
economic returns are limited by the low value of the land interest
owned. Many other Indians, however, see depressed returns because
the interests are dispersed, even though the total value of those inter-
ests may be significant. Even without increasing the ownership con-
centration by value, ownership could be concentrated within
individual parcels. The federal regulations permit owners of a frac-
tional interest to acquire interests from other owners of the same par-
cel.170 Since fractionation persists, private action under current law
is clearly insufficient.
Tribes could establish exchanges where members with interests in
fractionated land could trade interests. Consolidating ownership in a
parcel would allow owners either to use the lands themselves or to
bargain more effectively with renters. The OIA attempted to organize
exchanges on different reservations, but results were limited.171 In
addition, the Pine Ridge Reservation has organized an exchange to
allow allottees to consolidate their landholdings by trading with the
Tribe or other allottees. Exchanging interests requires nine bureau-
cratic steps, involving both the Tribe and BIA. The majority of trad-
ing is not between individuals, but instead between individuals and
the Tribe.172
In addition, facilitating partition has been proposed. Partition
may do little to facilitate farming or ranching, but it would allow
homeowners to secure marketable title to their homes. Partition and
liberalized exchange would ameliorate the problems associated with
fractionation. The Rosebud tribal president has estimated that parti-
tion and exchange could add $50 million to the tribal economy.173
169. Where the land is owned in fee, Leeds proposes that the tribe apply for trust
status once the joint tenancy is created. She argues that the tribe could reduce
costs by marketing immunity from state taxation as a benefit of a joint tenancy.
Id. at 842-44. One can imagine that local resistance might cause the Secretary of
the Interior to withhold trust status.
170. 25 C.F.R. 151.7 (2009).
171. Clow, supra note 71, at 145.
172. Hakansson, supra note 84, at 251.
173. Indian Trust Reform: Hearing on Views of the Administration and Indian County
of How the System of Indian Trust Management, Management of Funds and Nat-
ural Resources Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 102 (2005)
[hereinafter Hearing on Indian Trust Reform] (statement of Hon. Charles C.
Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota).
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Shoemaker proposes federal decontrol of conveyances between tri-
bal members.74 Originally, restraints on alienation were justified by
the incompetence of individual Indians to manage their own affairs in
the twenty-five years after allotment.175 Today, continued restraints
on alienation may be appropriate because sale to non-Indians gener-
ally reduces tribal sovereignty, which conflicts with current federal
policy.176 Federal decontrol will likely worsen inequality in Indian
country, a region already plagued with poverty. In addition, there is
some reason for concern since market abuses are likely in a new regu-
latory environment where valuation is uncertain at best. Shoemaker's
proposal has gained no political traction and it is doubtful there is
much political appetite for federal decontrol.177
Land exchanges and federal decontrol are not the only means to
increase individual control and use of fractionated lands. The 1984
Presidential Commission proposed pooling of interests by individuals
to facilitate cooperative farming or ranching.178 Under current law,
there is nothing to prevent cooperative farming or ranching on allot-
ted lands. The absence of cooperatives strongly suggests that individ-
ual action cannot overcome fractionation.
V. TRIBAL LAND CORPORATIONS
This Article proposes incorporation as a mechanism for increasing
tribal control over allotted land without the expense of purchasing the
underlying land. After a description of the proposal, this Article ex-
amines a similar corporation created on the Rosebud Reservation.
Since Federal action to limit or reduce fractionation is severely lim-
ited by Irving and Youpee, there is impetus for a tribal solution.179
Under Section 207, tribes may adopt codes regulating the disposition
of fractionated interests, but the process of consolidation is likely to be
slow. Since federal law imposes onerous consensus requirements,1SO
174. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 781-82. Hakansson reports that a "less burdensome
process regarding consolidation" was proposed to him at Pine Ridge, but it ap-
pears the suggestion was not as radical as Shoemaker's. See Hakansson, supra
note 84, at 260.
175. Compare this rationale for the trust status of land with the rationale for the fed-
eral government's trust relationship with Indian tribes, which springs from the
political dependency doctrine first advanced in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823).
176. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
177. The NCAI did not include federal decontrol on its list of proposals to reduce frac-
tionation. See NCAI, supra note 11.
178. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 51.
179. See James T. Hamilton, Progressing Back: A Tribal Solution for a Federal Mo-
rass, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 375 (2003); Bobroff, supra note 29, at 1620-23.
180. See 25 U.S.C. § 2218 (2006) (90% if five or fewer owners, 80% if five to ten own-
ers, 60% if ten to twenty owners, and majority of interests if twenty or more own-
ers). Prior to 2005, unanimous consent was required when there were five or
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effective control by Indian owners remains a distant prospect even
with significant consolidation. More than a century of increasing frac-
tionation is not likely to be reversed soon enough to satisfy the de-
mands for increased income and opportunity in the near-term.
A. Incorporation
One possible mechanism for reversing fractionation while preserv-
ing the underlying economic interests is for tribes to create a tribal
land corporation ("TLC").181 The Indian Reorganization Actl8 2 autho-
rizes tribes to incorporate. TLCs would acquire fractionated interests
in exchange for shares in the corporation. 183 Because the value of
each parcel is different, shares should not represent a given area, but
instead a specific value. Once the TLC controls all the fractionated
interests in a given parcel, it could then make leasing and use deci-
sions. The prospect of increased returns and tribal control should en-
courage many, if not most, owners to tender their interests in allotted
land, although hold-outs are likely. In addition to the expense in-
volved, purchasing hold-out interests will only encourage more owners
to hold-out since many owners may prefer cash now to dividends later.
Using the power of eminent domain may be more appropriate. Tri-
bal funds are limited and would quickly be depleted by acquiring frac-
tionated interests. Instead, this Article proposes paying compensation
in-kind rather than in money. Owners whose interests are con-
demned would receive interests in other parcels of equivalent value.
Using eminent domain, the TLC would take more land than it in-
tended to control. Interest owners who wanted to participate in the
TLC would receive shares while those that did not would receive inter-
ests in parcels outside the TLC zone. The goal would be to segregate
non-cooperative owners into parcels with no TLC ownership. While
the administrative costs are non-trivial, tribal or TLC funds are not
depleted through direct outlays. Eminent domain as a mechanism to
segregate owners who do not want to participate in the TLC would
increase the number of parcels for which the TLC could make leasing
and use decisions.
There is an additional benefit to the TLC model. Except where
parcels contain valuable mineral resources, the size of individual par-
cels is much smaller than the size of viable economic units. The value
fewer owners. See 25 U.S.C. § 2218 (2000) (amended by American Indian Pro-
bate Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-374 § 6(a)(10), 118 Stat. 1773, 1804).
181. Incorporation is not a new proposal. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles
Rhoad proposed this as early as 1929. See 72 CONG. REC. 1052 (1929).
182. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2006)).
183. See Ethel J. Williams, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-The Indian Heirship
Land Problem, 46 WASH. L. REV. 709, 730 (1971).
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of individual parcels depends on the ability to use nearby parcels. For
example, because water is distributed very unevenly on the high
plains, many parcels are useless as rangeland if access to a parcel
with water is prevented. Even where resources are distributed
evenly, the value of parcels would increase when many parcels are
aggregated since larger tracts are generally more valuable. The abil-
ity to segregate non-participants in parcels outside the economic unit
is important both to increase the value of TLC land and reduce conflict
with non-participants. In fact, non-participants may prefer transfer
to a peripheral parcel over the possibility of social pressure to cooper-
ate with TLC plans.
Tribal land corporations should be independent of the tribal coun-
cil. Political interference has been cited as a source of poor perform-
ance.1 8 4 There is no reason, however, for the TLC to take a narrow
view of its fiduciary duty to its shareholders. Depressed returns to
landowners are not the only economic problem in Indian country, nor
is it likely to be the only concern of TLC shareholders. TLC sharehold-
ers are also workers, ranchers, farmers, and tribal members. The
TLC may legitimately consider the interests of other stakeholders, in-
cluding the unemployed and environmental interests. In fact, better
stewardship of natural resources is likely to be a key contribution by
TLC to long-term Indian prosperity. Additionally, a TLC that consid-
ers the interests of all stakeholders will have more legitimacy when it
uses eminent domain to expand.
B. Two Caveats
Although the Indian Reorganization Act authorizes tribes to incor-
porate, only one tribe has created a tribal land corporation along the
lines discussed above. Before discussing that experiment, there are
two arguments about tribal enterprise to be addressed. Both argu-
ments occur frequently but are rarely examined carefully.
Much has been made of the divisions within Indian country. Some
have argued that internal divisions make tribal solutions to fractiona-
tion difficult or unworkable. The divisions between Red Cloud and
Crazyhorse, 'hand around the fort' and 'hostiles,' 'old dealers' and
'New Dealers,' American Indian Movement and the Guardians of the
Oglala Nation are real, of course.1 8 5 Yet, there is a real danger of'
overemphasizing these differences. Indians have a long history as the
184. E.g. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 29-30, 39, 41; ADAM DIAMANT. Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE ROSEBUD SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE 4 (1988); Robert J.
Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism
Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 798-99 (2001).
185. Hakansson, supra note 84, at 253; BIOLSI, supra note 19, at 151-78.
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'Other,' and have long been romanticized by non-Indians.1s 6 When
discussing the 'Other,' there is a real danger of fetishizing or exoticiz-
ing the ordinary since the act of perceiving the 'Other' frames how
they are perceived. 187 All human groups, from the halls of the United
Nations to the playground, have disputes, divisions, and differ-
ences.1 8 8 The claim that Indian tribes cannot work through their dif-
ferences while not extending the same argument to Republicans and
Democrats (or the tall and the short) is highly suspect.
While arguments about division and corruption are generally used
to undermine the case for increased tribal control, there is a second
common argument that overstates the case. Proponents of tribal con-
trol point to the collective or cooperative property and economic ar-
rangements that predate allotment. Ironically, proponents make the
same factual error that supporters of allotment made: simplifying the
wide variety of economic arrangements that existed in the territory of
the United States into a single model of Indian cooperation.1 8 9 Since
186. Part of romanticizing Indians is in perceiving them as a blank canvas on which to
project European notions and desires. When the Enlightenment needed a meta-
phor for life without rigid social and political control, Europeans identified Indi-
ans as the 'noble savage.' When concerns about the cost of industrialization
developed in the 19th century, Indians were refrained as a 'dying race.' Contem-
porary concerns about environmental degradation produce today's image of an
environmentally-sensitive Indian who is good steward of the land, living in har-
mony with nature. These are only a few of the images, but the point is not to
delineate these notions, but to recognize how they might frame our understand-
ing of Indians.
187. See Eileen Stillwaggon, Racial Metaphors: Interpreting Sex and AIDS in Africa,
34 DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 809 (2003). The tendency to fetishize the native is
pervasive, even among very sympathetic observers. For example, resistance to
using the plow instead of the hoe by the Santee Sioux is described as an "actual
religious objection, based on the notion that plowing would injure their fields."
MEYER, supra note 50, at 63. Note how legitimate concerns about erosion in an
area with limited soil fertility is exoticized by describing the belief as religious,
even though non-Indians often express stewardship in religious language. Meyer
also describes how Indian agents found "sinister" and tribal overtones in the cus-
toms like the sewing bee, even though the practice was common among non-Indi-
ans also. Id. at 193.
188. See Nick Meo, The Last Two Jews of Kabul. And They Hate Each Other, THE
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 11, 2004; Kevin Zhou, Feud Weakens Profs Tenure Bid, THE
HARVARD CRIMSON, Apr. 4, 2007.
189. Breezy generalizations are common in the literature. "All Indians, whether
hunter or planter, considered the concept of individual land ownership a religious
sacrilege. The [E]arth belonged to the Great One." Vaznelis, supra note 93, at
287. Unfortunately, the condescension of the assertion is not atypical, only its
recent publication. In contrast, Carlson reports land sales by the Yuman and
orchard sales by the Hopis before allotment. Leonard A. Carlson, Learning to
Farm: Indian Land Tenure and Farming Before the Dawes Act, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 67, 70-71 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1991). In addi-
tion, private ownership (which could be inherited, rented, and sold) was recog-
nized by California Indians over food-producing trees and by Indians in the
Pacific Northwest over fishing grounds. Id. at 72-73; Miller, supra note 184, at
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traditional property regimes have been so disrupted, it is unclear if
those regimes have any relevance to the modern problem of fractiona-
tion.190 In addition, economic and property relations were flexible (as
those relations are and were in European societies), so the form of eco-
nomic organization pre-contact may not be relevant.19 i For most
tribes, the information on property regimes and economic organization
is very limited. The metaphor of communism has been used, but its
application to pre-industrial production is limited. It is difficult now
to establish whether economic cooperation (e.g. hunting or fishing in
groups) was tribally-organized or the result of individual initiative.' 92
There is almost no evidence of common field farming (e.g. plantation
farming), which generally depends on centralized control.' 93 In con-
trast, there is much stronger evidence of post-production sharing.194
(Note that the welfare state does not require state enterprises.) Given
the disruption of traditional tribal life, the absence or presence of pre-
contact 'tribal enterprises' is hardly dispositive of whether tribal en-
terprises make sense today.19 5
Rather than starting from the assumption of Indian difference, a
more fruitful inquiry would consider the concentration of economic
770-73. There is good evidence that horses could be rented. Miller, supra note
186, at 774.
190. To cite one example among many, the allotting agent refused to recognize prior
individual claims on timber on the Yankton reservation. Before allotment, the
Yankton recognized private property in woodlands where an individual had ex-
pended some effort. The Yankton had asked the allotting agent to include pri-
vately-owned timber in allotments, but the agent did not include timber in any of
the allotments. Only when the agent had declared the timber a common resource
without protection was the timber cut and sold. CARLSON, supra note 34, at 88.
Note that Indians had no rights in timber (for sale) since theirs was a mere right
of occupancy. United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. 591, 592 (1873).
191. When the fur trade increased the value of trapping grounds, Indians in Labrador
developed private property regimes. Miller, supra note 184, at 771.
192. Guzman, supra note 121, at 650, asserts, "Common toil was efficient and pro-
duced common gain." But, without specification or evidence, the claim is hard to
evaluate. In contrast, Anderson provides several examples of individual produc-
tion. See Conservation, supra note 35. "Most evidence is consistent with the view
that Indian farming was carried out on individual plots . . . ." CARLSON, supra
note 34, at 86. In contrast, Miller, supra note 184, at 774, argues that even com-
munal activities were organized for individual benefit since the spoils were di-
vided based on individual effort or success.
193. CARLSON, supra note 34, at 85. In fact, the OIA encountered significant resis-
tance on the Blackfeet Reservation when it tried to create a tribal herd. Opposi-
tion was strongest from fullblood tribal members, "who had always considered
livestock in terms of individual possessions." JOHN C. Ewans, THE BLACKFEET:
RAIDERS ON THE NORTHWESTERN PLAINS 318 (1988).
194. Sharing is common worldwide and reflects informal insurance against depriva-
tion. CARLSON, supra note 34, at 106. Harvest sharing is described as a tax to
support public needs. Miller, supra note 184, at 783.
195. Note that no one has suggested that non-Indians return to traditional economic
forms (e.g. European feudalism) as a way to deal with current economic problems.
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and political power in the tribal council and generally pliant judiciar-
ies. Note that both these structures are non-Indian impositions,
rather than indigenous governance structures. While there are legiti-
mate fears about "capture and corruption,"196 those fears are also jus-
tified off the reservation. 197
C. The Rosebud Tribal Land Enterprise
Home of the Sicangu Oyate (one of the Lakota Sioux), the Rosebud
Reservation is located in south central South Dakota. Rosebud was
created in 1889 from the remnants of the Great Sioux Reservation es-
tablished by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868.198 The original reser-
vation was more than 3.2 million acres in five counties,19 9 of which
only one-third remained in Indian hands by 1934.200 Today, the res-
ervation has roughly 900,000 acres of trust land. There are 25,000
tribal members, of which 21,000 live on the reservations. 2o1 The res-
ervation was allotted: each head of household was eligible to receive
320 acres, each unmarried Indian over eighteen years old was eligible
for 160 acres, and each Indian under eighteen was eligible for eighty
acres. 20 2 The OIA allotted the majority of tribal members land in the
western part of the reservation, where rainfall averaged sixteen in-
ches per year, too dry for anything but grazing.20 3 Todd County was
entirely allotted, while neighboring Mellette and Tripp counties were
88% and 72% allotted, respectively. In contrast, the overwhelming ma-
jority of land in Gregory (9% allotted) and Lyman (4% allotted) coun-
ties was sold as surplus. 20 4 In those easternmost counties (Gregory
196. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 750.
197. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Governor Accused in Scheme to Sell Obama's Senate
Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008.
198. Had the Great Sioux Reservation been divided equally, each of the 25,000 Sioux
would have received 880 acres. Even after the reservation was reduced in 1889,
each tribal member would have received 500 acres, which is close to the size of a
viable ranch. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 6.
199. Eicher, supra note 61, at 11.
200. Joseph H. Cash & Herbert T. Hoover, The Indian New Deal and the Years that
Followed: Three Interviews, in THE PLAINS INDIANS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
107, 123 (Peter Iverson ed., 1985).
201. Hearing on Indian Trust Reform, supra note 173, at 99 (statement of Hon.
Charles C. Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota).
202. Eicher, supra note 61, at 11-12.
203. Id. at 12-14.
204. Id. at 88. The tribe had negotiated over $1 million in compensation for ceding
unallotted land, but Congress opted to sell the land on the tribe's behalf instead.
HENRIKSSON, supra note 15, at 184. Before 1904, the Federal government had
acquired surplus land directly. The opening of the Rosebud reservation set a pre-
cedent for sales to settlers on behalf of Indians. In testimony before the House
committee, Commissioner Jones argued that Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903), authorized Congress to act as if it were the "guardian or ward of a child 8
or 10 years of age" and ignore provisions in the 1868 and 1889 treaties requiring
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and Lyman), rainfall averages eighteen to twenty inches per year and
agriculture is possible, in addition to grazing. 20 5 The tribal land base
suffers from checkerboarding and roughly one-third of allotments
were excessively fractionated by 1960.206 The heirship status of allot-
ments is a "tremendous problem," causing some land to be "practically
worthless."20 7
Commissioner Collier intended Rosebud to be a test case for the
Indian New Deal. The Rosebud Sioux accepted the IRA in 1934, ap-
proved its IRA constitution in 1935 and received a corporate charter in
1937.208 The Tribal Land Enterprise (TLE) was created in 1943, at
which time 60% of the allotted lands were already fractionated to
some degree. 20 9
The TLE had two goals: reducing fractionation and helping Indians
acquire economically-sized units of land.2 10 Interests tendered to the
TLE would be conveyed to the tribe, but managed by the TLE.211 The
TLE was largely the product of Superintendent Whitlock, who strug-
gled against resistance from both the Sicangu Lakota and Washing-
ton. Whitlock experienced resistance from BIA officials at the Glacier
Park conference where he first presented the idea to his superiors, and
that resistance continued until January 1943.212 In addition, a signif-
icant portion of the tribe opposed the TLE, either because of dissatis-
faction with tribal leadership or fear of losing the little land they still
owned.213
In keeping with the inalienability of trust land, Whitlock believed
that TLE shares should be not transferrable. Tribal leaders wanted
three-quarters consent. PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 867-68. The reservation was
diminished by those land cessations. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584
(1997) (diminishing the reservations from five counties to one, Todd). The tribe
and its members retain land in the four counties no longer part of the reserva-
tion. Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments; and to Permit the Leasing of
Oil and Gas Rights on Navajo Allotted Lands: Hearing on S. 1586, S. 1315, and
H.R. 3181 Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 162 (1999) [here-
inafter Hearing on I.L.C.A. Amendments] (written testimony of Ben Black Bear,
Executive Director, Tribal Land Enterprise, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South
Dakota).
205. Eicher, supra note 61, at 14.
206. Id. at 11-12.
207. Id. at 19 (quoting Superintendent Holmes of the Rosebud Sioux Reservation).
208. Clow, supra note 71, at 147. Although increasing tribal autonomy was a goal of
the IRA, the OIA maintained a paternalistic role. As late as 1952, the Rosebud
superintendent believed the tribe was incompetent to manage its own affairs be-
cause of a lack of competent leaders (motivated instead by personal gain) and
excessive factionalism. Eicher, supra note 61, at 21.
209. BIOLSI, supra note 19, at 117.
210. Clow, supra note 71, at 151.
211. Id. at 152.
212. Id. at 148-51.
213. Id. at 154.
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transferrable shares (which give shareholders an asset in addition to
TLE dividends) and eventually prevailed. 2 14 To reduce further frac-
tionation, the TLE required that shareholders devise their section to a
single heir. Where none had been identified, the heirs as a group
would decide. In addition, the shares themselves could be devised. 2 15
As a condition of Secretarial approval, shareholders were given voting
rights to ensure that their interests would be protected. Tribal mem-
bers would receive Class A shares with voting rights in exchange for
land, while non-members would receive non-voting Class B shares.
Both classes of shares entitled the holder to receive dividends. 2 16 Tri-
bal members could sell their shares to non-members, but non-mem-
bers could not exercise their share's voting rights. 217 In addition,
shares would pay dividends; any profits beyond that would be used to
acquire more fractionated land.2 18
In addition, the value of shares was fixed, based on the appraised
value of local land. The face value of each share was $1, so sharehold-
ers would receive one share for each dollar of appraised value.
Tendering an undivided interest worth $10 would entitle the share-
holder to ten shares.2 19 Share values based on appraised land values
was a key defect in the TLE. Shares in most corporations have two
benefits: dividends and appreciation of the shares. Shares in the TLE,
however, could not appreciate in value as the value of the TLE assets
increased. Share undervaluation was greater because the appraised
value was too low. The first shares were issued based on land prices
in the 1943 Bureau of Agricultural Economics Real Estate Market in-
dex for South Dakota. Land values in 1943 were still depressed (re-
flecting low beef prices during the Great Depression), but would
appreciate by 140% by 1952. Rising land values combined with fixed
share values meant that shareholders received shares worth less than
the value of the land.220 In 1953, the value of each share was revised
upward from $1 to $2.43 and then again in 1959 to $2.98.221 Today,
the value of shares is determined annually. 222
214. Id. at 148.
215. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 21-22.
216. Clow, supra note 71, at 153.
217. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 21.
218. Hearing on Indian Trust Reform, supra note 173 (statement of Hon. Charles C.
Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota). The TLE's goal was
to pay a 4% dividend. Clow, supra note 71, at 155.
219. Clow, supra note 71, at 153.
220. Id. at 153, 154, 157-58. Grazing leases could be had for three or four cents an
acre in 1943. Cash & Hoover, supra note 200, at 114-15.
221. Eicher, supra note 61, at 94.
222. Hearing on I.L.C.A. Amendments, supra note 204, at 160-67 (written testimony
of Ben Black Bear, Executive Director, Tribal Land Enterprise, Rosebud Sioux
Tribe of South Dakota). In contrast, Tribal President and TLE Board Member
Colombe testified that the TLE has "systematically failed to perform the annual
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In addition to allotted trust lands, the Department of the Interior
assigned 28,000 acres of "submarginal lands" to the TLE for ten years
beginning in 1944. Submarginal lands were originally part of the res-
ervation, but had been abandoned by non-Indians and acquired by the
Federal government under the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act,
the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Bankhead-Jones Farm
Tenant Act. Since many of the tracts were isolated, roughly half of the
submarginal lands remained unused and the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment ("BLM") took control of leasing those lands in 1954.223
Within the first six years of operation, the TLE increased tribal
income from $40,000 to $220,000 simply by charging the same rent as
that on off-reservation grazing. In contrast, the OIA had leased allot-
ted lands to non-Indian ranchers at fixed minimum prices.2 24 Yet, the
overall success of the TLE in its early years was limited and it had
difficulty reaching the goal of a 4% dividend. The tribe did not receive
a dividend on the TLE shares it owned. 2 25 The costs of administration
were higher than anticipated because incomplete tender meant that
the TLE could not replace OIA or tribal administration. Rather than
simplifying the management of allotted lands, the TLE created an-
other level of bureaucratic involvement. The complexity of TLE trans-
action required the on-going involvement of the OIA.226 Between
1952 and 1959, the BIA spent $329,213 on realty administration on
Rosebud.227 Even today, the BIA retains "signatory authority" over
all accounts and transactions (including leasing), adding cost and con-
straining TLE autonomy.2 28
In addition, substantial acreage remained vacant and unused.
Like the submarginal lands, many of the tendered interests were ei-
ther partial or scattered. In addition, land restoration-necessary af-
ter the drought and soil loss of the 1930s-required fallowing the
land, reducing lease income.22 9
land valuations mandated by its bylaws. Increases in land values have not cre-
ated the concomitant rise in the value of certificates held by individual tribal
members." Hearing on Indian Trust Reform, supra note 173, at 101 (statement of
Hon. Charles C. Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota).
223. Clow, supra note 71, at 154-55.
224. Indian Fractionated Land Problems: Hearing on H.R. 11113 Before the Subcomm.
On Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. Of the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 41, 54, 46 (1966);
Hearings on S. 1309 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 130, 139 (1961).
225. There is some dispute whether the TLE decided to favor individuals over the
tribe or whether the tribe opted to forgo dividends to protect the interests of indi-
vidual Indians. See Clow, supra note 71, at 155.
226. Id. at 158.
227. Eicher, supra note 61, at 18.
228. Hearing on Indian Trust Reform, supra note 173, at 100 (statement of Hon.
Charles C. Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota).
229. Clow, supra note 71, at 155.
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Although transferrable shares had been a key tribal demand,
share trading led to resentment. Ideally, transferability would permit
shareholders to liquidate trivial interests and consolidate ownership
in larger parcels. 230 Consolidating interests was considered "particu-
larly appealing."2 3 1 But share certificates quickly became as negotia-
ble as cash, sometimes selling for as little as ten cents on the dollar.2 32
Some shareholders sold shares to finance capital investments, others
to avert economic hardship. Some of the transactions were "shady"
and the Secretary of the Interior revised the TLE by-laws in 1947 to
discourage sale. 233 Despite this, 841 of the original 1821 shareholders
had liquidated all their shares by 1952. In particular, the Rosebud
elderly protested that a "few highly aggressive mixed bloods... [were]
acquiring control of the reservation ... [and] assignments of land."2 34
Some consolidation was achieved, however. The tribe, for example,
was able to acquire undivided interests in 800 allotments by 1955.235
In addition, the TLE increased the availability of land for tribal mem-
bers; some leases were as large as 5000 acres, although most tribal
ranches were small, averaging seventy-two head of cattle. Despite
preference for intra-tribal leasing, insufficient interest meant that
land was frequently leased to non-Indian ranchers. 23 6 Even as late as
1959, two-thirds of TLE land was being leased by non-Indians. 23 7
Only thirty-four shareholders had received land assignments from the
TLE through 1945.23 8 By 1959, the number had increased to 330; but
ten of those individuals received 20% of the total acreage. Eight of
those ten individual assignees controlled 23% of all the cattle on the
reservation. 23 9
The collapse of agriculture in the 1930s prompted non-Indian out-
migration. This trend continued in the 1940s and 1950s as the struc-
ture of ranching changed and ranches grew much larger.2 4o On the
230. Id. at 156.
231. BIOLSI, supra note 19. For example, interests equivalent to 160 acres would per-
mit the shareholder to use 160 acres of TLE land. Cash & Hoover, supra note
200, at 115.
232. Clow, supra note 71, at 156-57. Cash & Hoover, supra note 200, at 115. Ben
Black Bear testified that shares can be redeemed for cash at any time. Hearing
on I.L.C.A. Amendments, supra note 204, at 161 (written testimony of Ben Black
Bear, Executive Director, Tribal Land Enterprise, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South
Dakota). Either he is mistaken or this was not true in the 1940s because it seems
nonsensical to sell shares for less than face value if the TLE is obligated to re-
deem them without discount.
233. Id. at 156-57.
234. Id. at 156.
235. Id. at 158.
236. Id. at 158-60.
237. Eicher, supra note 61, at 95.
238. BioLsi, supra note 19, at 119.
239. Eicher, supra note 61, at 94, 108.
240. Id. at 32-36, 115.
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reservation, the pattern of consolidation was also present, largely be-
cause of the disappearance of full-blood ranchers between 1949 and
1959.241 The BIA value system strongly encouraged herds of thirty
head of cattle, while the minimum efficient herd size was 100 to 200 in
western South Dakota by 1947.242
The limited success of the TLE was insufficient to defuse growing
resentment. The tribal council voted in 1954 and 1955 to liquidate the
TLE, but the Rosebud superintendent disapproved the resolutions.243
In addition, the off-reservation non-Indian community was strongly
opposed to the TLE, calling it "'communistic,' and hence un-Ameri-
can."244 The TLE had grown to 312,000 acres in 1959, of which 63,000
remained fractionated and the TLE had a net equity of $1 million. On
the other hand, the increase in fractionation between 1943 and 1959
was greater than the TLE's success in reducing fractionation and In-
dian land use hardly increased. 2 45 Between 1944 and 1959, 433,900
acres had been sold by individual Indians and the TLE was only able
to acquire 318,770 acres, leaving 115,130 acres lost to fee
patenting.2 46
By 1979, the TLE had grown to 400,000 acres with 1.9 million
shares outstanding.24 7 Between 1996 and 1999, the TLE acquired al-
most 10,000 acres of trust and restricted land, 58% of which had frac-
tionated interests of less than 2%.248 By 2005, the TLE had acquired
570,000 acres of land for the tribe. Each year, the TLE generates $3
million in gross revenue, of which $2 million is profit. 249 Between
$40,000 and $70,000 is spent each month to acquire fractionated
interests. 2 50
Yet critics argue that the TLE has been a "black hole for the finan-
cial interests of individual certificate holders."25 1 Although required
by its bylaws, the TLE has not performed annual land valuations,
241. Id. at 106, 115.
242. Id. at 185, 187-88.
243. Clow, supra note 71, at 160.
244. EDWARD VALANDRA, NOT WITHOUT OUR CONSENT: LAKOTA RESISTANCE TO TERMI-
NATION, 1950-59, 85 (2006).
245. Eicher, supra note 61, at 94-95, 98.
246. Id. at 91.
247. Fractionated Estate, supra note 15, at 22.
248. Hearing on I.L.C.A. Amendments, supra note 204, at 161 (written testimony of
Ben Black Bear, Executive Director, Tribal Land Enterprise, Rosebud Sioux
Tribe of South Dakota).
249. Hearing on Indian Trust Reform, supra note 173, at 101 (statement of Hon.
Charles C. Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota).
250. Hearing on I.L.C.A. Amendments, supra note 204, at 161 (written testimony of
Ben Black Bear, Executive Director, Tribal Land Enterprise, Rosebud Sioux
Tribe of South Dakota).
251. Hearing on Indian Trust Reform, supra note 173, at 101 (statement of Hon.
Charles C. Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota).
[Vol. 88:385
TRIBAL LAND CORPORATIONS
which would allow it to accurately value its shares.252 Critics argue
that land exchanged for shares in 1943 would produce a loss of $260
per acre, producing a loss to the tribe and its members that runs in the
millions of dollars.253 In addition, the TLE is accused of leasing land
to insiders, although the Code of Federal Regulations requires leasing
to the highest, sealed bid.254
D. Evaluating the Rosebud Tribal Land Enterprise
The Rosebud Sioux Reservation may be a flawed test case for the
tribal land corporation concept since the reservation is so poor. With
an 86% unemployment rate and few natural resources, prospects are
poor, whatever the form of land tenure. 25 5 Despite a "large population
[and] grinding poverty," the tribal president noted that the tribe is
rich in "traditions and trust lands."2 56 The majority of tribal land is
limited to grazing because of low rainfall. 257 In addition, Rosebud is
hardly the most fractionated reservation and allotments were twice as
large as the Dawes Act norm. 258 Only 26% of Indian land was allot-
ted, leaving a large majority in tribal control.259 The corporate form is
only necessary when land is not already under tribal control.
Writing in 1960, Carl Eicher found that land consolidation on
Rosebud did not stimulate economic growth. 260 The range manage-
ment system (also called unit leasing) introduced in the 1930s ensured
that land was used in appropriately large economic units. Of course,
administration remained a headache for BIA and tribal workers, but
fractionation was not a major constraint on use.2 6 1 In contrast, he
found that lack of credit was the major constraint on Indian ranchers.
Eicher identified two structural factors: the lack of collateral and
credit rating or history. In addition, he identified two social factors:
252. In addition, the BIA has "done very little to ensure that correct annual valua-
tions" were completed. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. In addition, one-third of those living on the reservation in 1986 received wel-
fare from either the BIA General Assistance Program or Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Culture and Institutes
as Public Goods: American Indian Economic Development as a Problem of Collec-
tive Action, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 219 (Terry L. Anderson
ed., 1992).
255. DIAMANT, supra note 184, at 1, 17, app. 2. In general, natural resources are dis-
tributed very unevenly in Indian country. Over half of the income from mineral
leases flow to only 10% of tribes. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 29.
256. Hearing on Indian Trust Reform, supra note 173, at 99 (statement of Hon.
Charles C. Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota).
257. Eicher, supra note 61, at 14.
258. Id. at 11-12.
259. Id. at 90.
260. Id. at 185.
261. Id. at 99, 184.
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discrimination (two local banks were known for refusing Indian busi-
ness) and the perception that Indians received significant government
financing and hence did not need private credit.2 62 Although land was
available in large units, credit policies and the BIA value system lim-
ited most Indian ranchers to subsistence scale.2 63 Eicher's findings
are consistent with Trosper's findings on ranching on the Northern
Cheyenne Reservation. 2 64 Trosper found that Indian and non-Indian
ranchers were equally efficient, but Indian ranchers were undercapi-
talized which he attributed to land tenure. The lack of education and
agricultural extension is often identified as an impediment to eco-
nomic progress. 26 5 Yet the economic literature does not support the
claim that improved agricultural extension is desirable or even benefi-
cial since undercapitalization is the main impediment to Indian
ranching.
Economic benefits, however, are not the exclusive criterion for
evaluating the TLE. The TLE has acquired land in Tripp, Gregory,
and Lyman counties. Under the Isolated Tracts Act, 2 6 6 Todd and Mel-
lette counties have been approved as a consolidation area. 26 7 When
the TLE acquires title to fee land, the Secretary must take the land
into trust.2 68
The experience of the Rosebud TLE is discouraging, but it provides
several lessons for tribes organizing a TLC. First and foremost, the
Rosebud TLE shows the costs of uneven tender. Returns were de-
pressed because the TLE was unable to assemble 100% interests in
enough parcels. Since hold-outs are likely, the TLC should use emi-
nent domain to assemble large blocks while relocating uncooperative
landowners. In addition, a TLC that controlled most of the land on a
reservation could replace the BIA in land administration, rather than
adding another layer of cost.
Superintendent Whitlock was wrong to insist that shares in the
TLE have a fixed value. In fact, the value of TLE shares was not truly
fixed since prices in the secondary market fluctuated, sometimes trad-
ing at a steep discount to face value.269 The value of TLE shares was
262. Id. at 125-26.
263. Id. at 185.
264. Ronald L. Trosper, American Indian Relative Ranching Efficiency, 68 THE AMERI-
CAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 503 (1978).
265. See, e.g., CARLSON, supra note 34, at 81.
266. Act of Dec. 11, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-196, 77 Stat. 349.
267. Todd County, South Dakota v. Aberdeen Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 33
IBIA 110, 111 (1999).
268. Id. When the BIA has attempted to slow trust land expansion through adminis-
tration rule-making, the tribe has resisted those efforts. See Acquisition of Title
to Land in Trust, 64 Fed. Reg. 17574 (proposed Apr. 12 1999) (codified at 25
C.F.R. 151).
269. Clow, supra note 71, at 156-57. Cash & Hoover, supra note 200, at 115.
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only fixed at the moment of tender. Ten dollars of land traded for ten
shares. Fixed value shares greatly simplified the on-going tender of
shares after the TLE was organized. If a landowner decided to tender
shares after the initial tender, how many shares should be awarded in
exchange for land appraised at $10 if the value of shares fluctuated
freely? Should the shareholder receive ten shares, to ensure that
every shareholder received the same consideration for their land? Or
should the shareholder receive the same number of shares for the
same consideration? Whatever the merits, either decision is likely to
create resentment. But, a new TLC should not expand gradually like
the Rosebud TLE, because uneven tender reduced returns. If the TLC
uses eminent domain to include all or most of the reservation, then
the problems of valuation are reduced.
Allowing shares to fluctuate in value is important for several rea-
sons. Fluctuating share prices provide information to shareholders,
management, employees, and other interested parties. If share prices
are fixed, monitoring is more expensive and likely to be less effective.
Well-monitored management contributes to shareholder value.
Shareholders in the TLE only receive a dividend. Fluctuating share
prices would permit asset appreciation greater than the increase in
appraised land values. Asset appreciation is a key benefit of share
ownership.
The Rosebud Sioux were right to demand share transferability. In
addition to general concerns about autonomy and voluntary associa-
tion, non-transferability depresses returns. Thirteen regional corpo-
rations were created by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act;
those shares are inalienable. Karpoff and Davis found clear evidence
of depressed returns. In addition, non-transferrable shares remove
the opportunity for exit, which encourages shareholders to increase
costly monitoring. Lastly, non-transferrable shares create no price
signals, also increasing monitoring costs. 2 70
VI. EMINENT DOMAIN
While tribal land corporations could certainly elect to expand on a
purely voluntary basis, there are some very good reasons for including
some interest-holders against their will.271 While many interest-hold-
ers will opt to tender, some may not. From an ex ante perspective, it is
very difficult to identify which interest-holders will make land plan-
ning more difficult. It is very likely that some interest-holders in an
270. Jonathan M. Karpoff & Edward M. Rice, Organizational Form, Share Transfera-
bility and Firm Performance: Evidence from the ANCSA Corporations, 24 J. FIN.
ECON. 69, 80-81, 98-100 (1989).
271. Hakansson, supra note 84, at 257-58, proposes eminent domain as a tool to com-
bat fractionation, albeit with cash compensation.
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individual allotment will tender, while others will not. 27 2 In that situ-
ation, the tribal land corporation would actually worsen the position of
interest-holders because income would pass through another layer of
bureaucracy, inevitably reducing net income.
Uneven tender would create economic losses. Although less pro-
nounced in mining, most allotments are significantly smaller than the
prevailing size of economic units. Perhaps most evident on ranching
lands on the high plains, even 320 acres is a fraction of the size of the
smallest viable ranches. In the Dakotas in the late 1950s, 2500 to
3000 acres were required for an efficient, profitable ranch.273 One of
the chief benefits of TLC management would be that the TLC could
assemble parcels of land in the most economically-productive manner
possible. Inholdings created by pockets of non-tendered shares would
disrupt one of the main mechanisms for creating value out of allotted
lands.
The Rosebud TLE found that uneven tender reduced the value cre-
ated by a novel land tenure structure. Tendered interests were spread
across many parcels and where the TLE controlled an entire parcel,
the parcels were non-contiguous. Many shareholders no longer re-
ceived IIM payments, so the tribal government elected not to receive
dividends on its shares to permit the TLE to pay individual sharehold-
ers a dividend. 274 In addition, the tribal government authorized in-
come from other tribal lands to be used to pay a dividend to individual
shareholders. 275 Over time, more interests have been tendered and
the problems of uneven tender have decreased. Although problems of
uneven tender may decrease over time, any TLC would benefit from
the power of eminent domain. With the power of condemnation, the
TLC could assemble parcels in such a way as to maximize the eco-
nomic return. 276
But, the Supreme Court has found in Irving and Youpee that Con-
gress may not escheat interests in allotted lands, even where the in-
terest is inchoate. Whether tribal probate codes that include escheat
provisions similar to Section 207 are also takings is not certain. When
Youpee was decided, no tribe had adopted a code regulating the dispo-
272. Other proposals do not restrict uneven tender. See id. at 259-60.
273. Peter Paul Dorner, The Economic Position of the American Indians: Their Re-
sources and Potential for Development 108 (Feb., 1959) (unpublished Ph.D. the-
sis, Harvard University) (on file with Harvard University Archives).
274. Clow, supra note 71, at 155.
275. Id.
276. Of course, there is also the danger that the TLC could use the power of eminent
domain for empire-building or other goals unrelated to increasing returns for
shareholders. So long as the TLC does not reduce returns to interest holders,
there is some tribal sovereignty benefit in removing management from the BIA
and returning it to tribal bodies.
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sition of fractionated land.277 Thus, the Court did not address
whether tribal action would be immune from the reasoning in Irving.
By its terms, the Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes.278 As
sovereign entities, tribes are not restricted by constitutional protec-
tions in the same way as states. Tribes are subject, however, to the
Indian Civil Rights Act;279 Section 1302(5)(8) mirrors the language of
the Fifth Amendment. Tribes have not used the power of eminent do-
main in any significant way to consolidate land tenure. 28 0
Would taking private property interests to resolve the problem of
fractionated heirship constitute a public purpose? Under Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff,281 one would have to conclude that it
would. Fractionated heirship presents similar problems as concen-
trated land tenure since it leads to environmental degradation, pov-
erty, and unemployment. 28 2
Takings require just compensation,28 3 generally defined as fair
market value.284 Fair market value implies a willing, informed buyer
and a willing, informed seller.2 8 5 But, fractionated heirship interests
may not be sold freely. The comparable sales approach produces bet-
ter results than the cost or capitalization of income approach.
The more difficult part of the comparable sales approach is not
finding similar parcels in the local area; instead, the challenge is de-
ciding whether and how to adjust the value for the large number of
owners. Even with majority voting, 28 6 more owners impose real costs
and depress the value of the land. Simply to divide the total value of
the allotment by the shares held by individual interest holders would
actually over-compensate them since the analysis ignores a significant
277. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 245 (1997).
278. However, the Fourteenth Amendment does protect Indians. See United States ex
rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 697 (D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891) (the
definition of "person" is "comprehensive enough . to include even an Indian").
279. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
280. Eminent Domain, supra note 37, at 74. Although some commentators have ques-
tioned whether tribes retain the power of eminent domain in light of recent opin-
ions that limited tribal sovereignty, the BIA asserts that tribes have the power of
eminent domain. Id. at 75-76.
281. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The Midkiff holding was recently recognized in Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
282. Shoemaker, supra note 4, at 752.
283. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1943).
284. See, e.g., Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d 638, 640-41
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1943));
Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513, 518-19 (Ariz. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 986 (1986).
285. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374-75; Masheter v. Ohio Holding Co., 313 N.E.2d 413,
416-17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); Sacramento S. R.R.
Co. v. Heilbron, 104 P. 979 (Cal. 1909).




determinant of value. Interest-holders would receive significantly
more than the economic value of their interest. Adequate compensa-
tion should reflect the diminution in value caused by the large number
of owners.
Yet it is unclear how to adjust the value of the allotment for the
large number of interest-holders. Outside of Indian country, there are
very few parcels with as many owners as an average allotted parcel.
So appraisers have relatively few data with which to calculate the ad-
justment. Most interests worth less than 20% have no marketable
value.287 Even if a methodology could be developed off the reserva-
tion, it would not account for the special restrictions of Indian land.
While the legal standard requires taking into account current govern-
ment regulation, 28 8 interest-holders may feel the tribe has affirma-
tively endorsed allotment and mismanagement by relying on those
depressed values when paying compensation. 28 9 Consider someone
who broke a bicycle and then stole it, yet insisted on paying only the
scrap value of the bicycle in restitution. Although dividing the total
value of the parcel by the interests without adjusting for the large
number of owners will consistently over-compensate interest-holders,
it appears to the only politically-palatable option for tribes.
Tribes, however, do not have significant sources of capital. 29o The
federal government has shown itself unwilling to devote more than
trivial resources to land consolidation. Section 5 of the Indian Reor-
ganization Act (1934) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to spend
$2 million annually to purchase land, water, and surface rights on be-
half of Indian tribes, except for the Navajo. Between 1934 and 1974,
however, only $5,988,077 was spent to acquire 595,157 acres.2 91 Con-
287. Widdoss, supra note 126, at 2.
288. See United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 284
(1949); United States v. Land, 62.50 Acres, 953 F.2d 886, 890 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. 174.12 Acres of Land, 671 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1982); cf. Fla.
Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1053 (1987) (no adjustment where the law restricting use is
unconstitutional).
289. See Guzman, supra note 121, at 630 ("To permit the government to dodge com-
pensating allottees by asserting that it had already 'taken' so much that no expec-
tations regarding future rights exist would create a painfully unfair situation.");
cf. Clow, supra note 71, at 145 ("[Tjhe second and third generations became es-
sentially landless" implies that allottees have already been dispossessed).
290. One reason is that tribes cannot issue tax-exempt bonds, unlike other municipal
corporations. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 42-43; Gavin Clarkson,
Tribal Bondage: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Eco-
nomic Development (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Olin Center for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 06-006, 2006).
291. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON PURCHASE OF INDIAN LAND AND ACRES OF
INDIAN LAND IN TRUST: 1934-1975, at 4-5 (1976) (prepared by Theodore W. Tay-
lor). During that period, the OIA/BIA could have sought $84 million under Sec-
tion 5 from Congress, but did not. The bulk of Section 5 appropriations were
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gress has attempted to deal with the problem of fractionated heirship
through legislation twice in the last twenty years, but has shown no
interest in dealing with the progress through outright purchase except
the pilot program, later expanded slightly.2 9 2 The cost of purchasing
all lands affected by fractionated heirship is non-trivial. In fact, the
lack of money has been indentified as the major obstacle to reducing
fractionation. 2 93
Thus, the most appropriate compensation is interests or parcels of
equivalent value. Some commentators have asserted that exchanging
parcels of equivalent value should be characterized as a mere "substi-
tution of assets,"2 94 thus no taking would occur. But, land is special.
Every parcel is considered unique. The Court applied a rigidly formal-
istic approach in Irving and Youpee, so exchanging minute interests of
almost no value might be considered a taking. Even if a taking is
found to have occurred, a parcel or interest of equivalent value should
be adequate compensation, particularly if BIA leasing is the only ben-
eficial use the owner receives.
The use of eminent domain is likely to produce at least some resis-
tance from those affected. An early draft of the Indian Reorganization
Act included a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to
compel transfers from individual Indians to tribal corporations. That
provision was removed upon the request of delegates from eighteen
tribes at a meeting in Rapid City, South Dakota.29 5 Recently, forced
purchase has been proposed in connection with land consolidation. 296
There are several ways for a TLC to mollify or atteunate opposition to
the use of eminent domain. Those affected by eminent domain could
be given priority in leasing, even over other tribal members. In addi-
tion, the TLC might grant tribal members usufructory rights, so that
those who lost land might still be able to gather berries, for example,
on "their" land. Lastly, the TLC should permit access for recreational
or religious observance. 29 7 Recreational, religious, and usufructory
rights all contribute to the perception that TLC land is tribal land,
managed for the benefit of the tribe as a whole.
made between 1934 and 1946; in 1951 the remaining balance was transferred to
another account. Id. at 4-5, 40.
292. As noted before, the total amount of money is less than what would be necessary
each year to prevent increasing fractionation. NCAI, supra note 11, at 2. Several
commentators, including Hakansson, have proposed purchase of fractionated in-
terests, perhaps using eminent domain. See Hakansson, supra note 84, at
257-260.
293. HEIRSHIP, supra note 44, at 19.
294. NCAI, supra note 11, at 4.
295. BioLSi, supra note 19, at 68-70, 75.
296. NCAI, supra note 11, at 3.
297. I would like to thank Joseph Singer for suggesting this.
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VII. ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR THE TLC
Economic theory suggests that the TLC will manage Indian land
better than the BIA. The BIA is a conduit of revenue rather than the
recipient. Agents face different incentives from their principals, well-
discussed in the literature on the principal-agent problem. Indians,
however, are not the BIA's principal. The BIA answers to the Presi-
dent and Congress. Individual BIA employees answer to their super-
visors and ultimately to the agency director. While Indians can
attempt to influence the BIA, the President, and Congress, non-Indi-
ans with adverse interests can do the same. Indians, however, face a
structural disadvantage: Congress represents the states, not Indian
tribes. The sad experience of the OIA and BIA is that non-Indians
have been more successful.
The BIA does not receive any direct benefit from leasing allotted
lands, so it has no incentive to minimize the cost of administration. In
fact, the BIA has the perverse incentive to increase the cost of admin-
istration. Increased red tape provides job security, continued or in-
creased funding, and even the possibility of graft. The BIA is not
unique in this regard; bureaucrats tend to maximize staffing.2 98 The
BIA's ability to increase administration procedure, and hence cost, is
limited by government practice and Executive and Congressional
oversight. BIA employees have no incentive to exceed mandated effi-
ciency targets, which are generally very lax in the federal government.
Civil service protections undermine even the incentive of mandated
efficiency targets.
Increased tribal self-determination can lead to job losses in the
BIA. Public Law 638 ("P.L. 638") authorizes tribes to contract with
the BIA to perform work previously done by the agency. Although in-
creased tribal sovereignty is a federal goal, it is not necessarily a goal
of the BIA or its employees. Where tribes have replaced BIA manage-
ment, management is often superior. BIA employees, however, have
lost their jobs, which strongly discourages the BIA from facilitating
P.L. 638 programs.
By 1992, forty-nine tribes had contracted with the BIA through the
P.L. 638 program to manage tribal forests. In the process, four-thou-
sand BIA forestry workers were replaced with tribal members, en-
gendering no small resistance from the BIA.299 Not surprisingly, the
performance of tribally-managed forestry operations is significantly
298. For empirical evidence, see William Orzechowski, Economic Models of
Bureacracy: Survey, Extension and Evidence, in BUDGETS AND BUREACRATS: THE
SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 229 (Thomas E. Borcherding ed., 1977). Com-
pared with private firms producing the same outputs, public agencies use greater
labor per unit of output. McChesney, supra note 46, at 322.
299. Matthew B. Krepps, Can Tribes Manage Their Own Resources? A Study of Ameri-
can Indian Forestry and the 638 Program, in WHAT CAN TRIBES Do? STRATEGIES
[Vol. 88:385
TRIBAL LAND CORPORATIONS
better since tribes will benefit from better management while the BIA
does not. Tribal loggers were 75% more productive than BIA loggers.
The effect is more pronounced for managers. The typical tribal high-
skill worker adds 24,000 board feet per year. In contrast, the typical
BIA high-skill worker reduces the timber harvest by 14,000 board feet
per year.30 0 Replacing the remaining BIA forestry workers with tribal
members using P.L. 638 should increase productivity by 40% and in-
crease tribal revenue by $15 million nationwide. 3 0
BIA control does more than suppress productivity; the price re-
ceived is also depressed. Tribes contracting under P.L. 638 do a much
better job of marketing timber than the BIA. Hiring one more tribal
high-skill worker adds 6% to timber sales prices, while the additional
BIA worker adds only 1.4%.302 This effect is even more pronounced
because tribes often sell timber to tribal lumbermills at below-market
prices (to plump the profitability of the tribal enterprise and protect
jobs).303 Although P.L. 638 contracting does improve the performance
of tribal forestry, the success is somewhat uneven. Tribes with signifi-
cant business experience are more successful.3o4 For example, the
White Mountain Apache Tribe runs one of the most productive saw-
mills in the southwest and generates $30 million in annual revenue
with a 90% tribal workforce. 3o 5 While the average lumbermill in the
west takes 7.4 labor hours to produce one-thousand board feet, the
tribal lumbermill takes only 5.7 labor hours. In addition, the milled
lumber sells for a 15% to 20% premium over the regional average.30 6
Even where BIA and Indian interests are not adverse, the involve-
ment of another government agency increases costs (and thus de-
presses returns to Indians). This would be true even if the BIA were
not notorious for its inefficiency and potential for delay. In addition to
AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 182 (Stephen
Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992).
300. Id. at 188.
301. Id. at 192.
302. Id. at 196-97. Note that the estimate for the effect of BIA high-skill workers is
only significant at the 85% level.
303. Id. at 195-96.
304. The effect of previous tribal business experience is significant statistically. For
every 10% increase in employment in tribal enterprises, the annual timber har-
vest increases by 306,000 board feet and stumpage prices increase 17%. Id. at
189, 196.
305. The tribal forest generates $7 million in net revenue per year. In addition, a
tribally-owned ski resort generates $9 million, while trophy hunting brings in
$1.5 million. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 254, at 224. The Fort Apache Timber
Company is the largest tribal forestry enterprise and one of the hundred largest
forestry enterprises nationwide. FRANTz, supra note 84, at 271.
306. Joseph P. Kalt & Stephen Cornell, The Redefinition of Property Rights in Ameri-
can Indian Reservations: A Comparative Analysis of Native American Economic
Development, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY: SELF-GovERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT 121 (Lyman H. Legters & Fremont J. Lyden eds., 1994).
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the potential for delay, surprise, and additional cost, even innocuous
decisions or policies can discourage private enterprise. For example,
the BIA may impose lease terms different from those common in the
private sector. Even where the terms are neutral, their novelty im-
poses costs on private parties. But, the problem is broader than novel
contract language. Administrative control permits the BIA to force
development, as well as prevent use through changes in transaction
rules or costs. Even the BIA has recognized that its power to set lease
terms gives it the power to discourage use and development. 30 7 In a
variety of ways, BIA involvement deters business activity, both Indian
and non-Indian.3OS
The BIA has little incentive to bargain hard with potential lessees,
since neither the agency nor individual employees receive any more
revenue. Hard-bargaining is time consuming, difficult, and poten-
tially unpleasant, especially since non-Indian BIA employees would be
defending Indian interests against the pecuniary interests of their
non-Indian neighbors, generally in an atmosphere of racial identifica-
tion. In small, isolated communities, concentrated economic power is
likely to have more influence. In addition, the BIA's perceived mission
for many years was to develop Indian-owned resources for the public
benefit. Therefore, hard bargaining would likely lead to congressional
pressure since lessees could complain to their representatives.
In addition, the regulations that apply to Indian land are more
"flexible" than those that apply to the public lands, allowing the BIA
more leeway to accommodate non-Indian interests at the expense of
Indian income. 30 9 For example, the BIA sold timber for as little as
$16 per one-thousand board feet, even though export prices were more
than $1000 per one-thousand board feet.3 1o
There is strong evidence that the BIA has failed to demand suffi-
cient rent for allotted agricultural lands. In addition, it is often far
simpler for the BIA to lease to large non-Indian operators who have
307. If rule changes follow resource business cycles, the effect is boom-and-bust in In-
dian country at the cost of stable incomes, profitable reinvestment and diversifi-
cation. If the rules are adjusted counter-cyclically, however, Indians are
continually impoverished by selling when prices are low. Rational actors would
then avoid capital-intensive investment, instead preferring to invest where fed-
eral control is weakest. Selling fireworks or tax-free liquor and tobacco may seem
risky because barriers to entry are small, but probably reflect a small capital risk.
Barsh, supra note 26, at 819-20.
308. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 31, 49.
309. Secretarial discretion is greater, allowing any requirement to be waived, for ex-
ample. Barsh, supra note 26, at 821.
310. Federal Government's Relationship with American Indians: Hearings Before the
Special Comm. on Investigations of the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st
Cong. 69 (1989) (statement of James Spitz, Forestry Consultant, Warm Spring
and Yakima Tribes, Bend, Or.).
[Vol. 88:385
TRIBAL LAND CORPORATIONS
the resources to lease many parcels at once.3 1 1 In 1973, Economic Re-
search Associates found that typical off-reservation parcels generated
rents that averaged 35% of gross crop value, whereas leases on the
Fort Hall reservation (Shoshone-Bannock Tribes) were only 2.3%. A
later GAO investigation argued that the methodology in that study
was flawed, but still found a $60 per acre disparity in net income for
irrigated lands.3 12 The GAO argued that the disparity reflected in-
creased costs, although it could only explain $20 per acre in tangible
costs. 3 13 Estimates of losses run as high as $330 million in the 1980s
alone.3 14 Losses are not limited to insufficient rent. When beef prices
collapsed in 1921, the OIA reduced the rent on allotted land in Pine
Ridge. In addition, the OIA failed to pursue non-Indian ranchers who
abandoned their leases leading to losses for Indian owners. 3 15 In
1931, the OIA extended the payment term for non-Indian purchasers:
debt relief to the detriment of the Indian sellers.
In addition, there is evidence that the BIA failed to require lessees
to conserve the value of the land adequately, diminishing the value of
allotted lands. Studies at Fort Hall found sharp disparities in land
management and soil conservation practices on and off-reservation.
By 1974, 16,000 acres of the Ross Fork watershed had been "virtually
destroyed."3 16 Even where the BIA made nominal efforts to protect
the long-term viability of agriculture, enforcement or contract design
were lacking. Most leases at Fort Hall required the planting of alfalfa
before the end of the lease term, but the penalty for failing to plant
alfalfa was set too low and so it was cheaper for lessees to pay the
penalty.3 17 Planting alfalfa protects the soil from erosion and regen-
erates soil nutrients, both of which protect the value of a grazing
lease.
In 1898, the Curtis Act took the power to lease hydrocarbons from
the tribes and gave it to the OIA. Indian resources were developed
very quickly, peaking at a quarter of total production in 1908-1909.318
As prices declined, the OIA made a policy decision to reduce Indian
311. See Williams, supra note 183, at 712-13.
312. The GAO methodology itself may be flawed since it found slightly higher net in-
come for dry land agriculture and pasture reservations lands compared with off-
reservations lands. It is hard to imagine that the BIA could extract a premium
for leasing Indian land since farmers have a choice of parcels to lease and no
particular preference for Indian land.
313. TASK FORCE SEVEN: RESERVATION & RES. DEV. & PROT., REPORT ON RESERVATION
AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION 37-38 (Comm. Print 1976) [here-
inafter RESERVATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION].
314. S. REP. No. 101-216, at 105 (1989).
315. McDONNELL, supra note 54, at 68.
316. RESERVATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 313, at
39.
317. Id.
318. Barsh, supra note 26, at 813.
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production to support prices. 3 19 Barsh finds that Indian oil was sold
at a discount even when compared with oil from the public domain,
which paid only a nominal one-eighth royalty.3 20 Even after competi-
tive bidding was introduced in 1925, undervaluation and lax monitor-
ing further reduced Indian revenue. 32 1 Long-term coal leases where
royalties were fixed (in cents per ton) led to Indian losses when prices
rose in the 1910s and 1960s. While most coal was bid competitively,
OIA/BIA involvement discouraged private interest, so fewer bids were
received than when public domain coal was auctioned.322 Underpric-
ing of government resources has been used to stimulate private indus-
try, albeit at a cost to taxpayers. 32 3 When Indian resources have been
sold on the cheap, the cost is not a broadly shared "tax," but instead
government-run theft.324
The losses from BIA mismanagement are hard to estimate accu-
rately because the BIA has yet to complete a soil classification or tim-
ber, water, or mineral inventories. Without knowing the extent of
Indian resources, it is hard to evaluate the magnitude of the losses.
However, overpayment is unlikely since non-Indians have no special
affinity for Indian resources. Overpriced resources will find no buy-
ers, so pricing mistakes will be biased only in one direction. In addi-
tion, overuse and degradation are more likely when the extent of the
resource is unknown. In the absence of an inventory, grazing and tim-
ber permits are based on historical use, likely representing overuse
and degradation. 3 25 Historical use patterns throughout the United
States lead to overuse, e.g. the Dust Bowl. In addition, the BIA
spends little to preserve and maintain Indian resources. While the
U.S. Forest Services spends $2.30 per acre (and private landowners
$5.50 per acre), the BIA spends just $1.60 per acre.32 6
Like any organization, the TLC and its employees present a princi-
pal-agent problem. In contrast to the BIA, the TLC's principals are its
shareholders. The TLC and its employees do not answer to any non-
Indian. Of course, the incentives facing the TLC and its employees
are not the same as one of its shareholders. TLC employees can bene-
fit from increased compensation at the expense of dividends. Empire-
319. After 1929, leasing on Indian land was suspended, except where required by law
or necessary to prevent seepage. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 816.
322. Id.
323. See MARION CLAWSON & BURNELL HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE AND
MANAGEMENT 253 (1957); PAUL W. GATES & ROBERT W. SWENSON, HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 746 (U.S. Public Land Law Review Commission,
1968).
324. Barsh, supra note 26, at 816.
325. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 3, at 47.
326. FRANTZ, supra note 84, at 265 n.27.
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building can lead to inefficient spending. Increased social standing
and the ability to arrange jobs for friends and family at a profitable
enterprise are clear benefits in small, isolated communities. The TLC
and its employees can benefit in many ways at the expense of share-
holders, which is unfortunately true any time that ownership and con-
trol are split.
In contrast to the BIA, the TLC and its employees do not benefit
from charging low rents. The TLC and its employees have every in-
centive to bargain hard and insist on every contract provision that will
increase revenue or protect the resources. Even if the TLC and its
employees divert some of the increased revenue, shareholders are still
better off. Good corporate governance, however, should provide share-
holders with the ability to monitor and influence management. Since
most reservations are small, isolated communities, monitoring may be
cheaper and more effective because of social pressure.
Although economic theory would suggest that returns to individual
Indians would improve if land management were transferred from the
BIA to a TLC, there is little empirical foundation. No thorough eco-
nomic analysis of the TLE has been attempted. Moreover, the TLE
had several defects (e.g. fixed value shares, uneven tender, etc.) that
limit its usefulness when evaluating the TLC model.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Allotment has not provided individual Indians with economic op-
portunity; instead, it has weakened tribal structures and shrunk the
tribal land base. The administrative burden is significant, absorbing
federal monies that could be used elsewhere in Indian Country. In
addition, transaction costs inhibit economic development and depress
the returns to individual Indians. Congress has attempted to reduce
fractionation through regulating devise and descent. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has limited the quickest mechanism for consoli-
dating land ownership. However, any consolidation program that re-
lies solely on inheritance will take decades to reduce fractionation.
The literature on fractionation has produced several interesting
suggestions. Unfortunately, changing the default rules, partition, or
increasing individual autonomy requires federal action. So far, Con-
gress has shown little interest in addressing fractionation except
through inheritance law (and purchase on a very small scale). Tribal
purchase of future interests does not require federal action, but it is
too expensive for most tribes affected by fractionation. Together,
these proposals might reduce fractionation, albeit not on a grand
scale.
Instead, tribes should rely on incorporation and eminent domain to
consolidate ownership and control of allotted lands in a tribal enter-
prise. Interests in allotted lands can be exchanged for shares in the
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TLC, limiting the cost of formation. Eminent domain should be used
to prevent uneven tender and quickly expand to an efficient scale.
Since funds are limited, compensation for the taking of allotted inter-
ests should be an interest of equivalent value in other parcels. The
Rosebud TLE is just such a TLC, although with several structural de-
fects imposed by the OIA. Even with weak shareholder control, the
incentives facing the TLC are closer to the individual Indians than the
BIA. Economic theory suggests that the TLC should provide better
management of trust land.
Incorporation is not a panacea. This model is most appropriate for
tribes where both the resource and culture are appropriate for central-
ized management. The BIA should continue to purchase heavily-frac-
tionated parcels, particularly where the value of individual interests
is de minimis. At the very least, the BIA should purchase all interests
worth less than the cost of processing a lease, currently estimated to
be $50. The administrative costs of heavily-fractionated parcels would
burden the TLC, depressing returns. Improved management of allot-
ted lands will improve economic opportunities for Indian enterprise
and increase returns to landowners. However, the economic develop-
ment in Indian Country still faces significant obstacles.
Any proposal that expands the tribal land base will face non-In-
dian resistance. 3 27 However, tribes do not and should not represent
non-Indian interests. Resistance and enmity, unfortunately, may be
the price of restoring tribal sovereignty and control over Indian re-
sources. In addition, the federal government has a responsibility to
encourage, rather than prevent, economic development in Indian
Country. If the federal government is to live up to its rhetoric, Con-
gress and the BIA should assist tribes in eliminating fractionation of
allotted lands.
327. Hakansson, supra note 84, at 259.
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